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Abstract
RACHA MOUSSA: Essays in Sovereign Default and International Financial Lib-
eralization.
(Under the direction of Dr. Anusha Chari.)
My dissertation is a collection of three papers that deal with the issues of sovereign default
and international financial liberalization. The first paper is titled: Debt Denomination, Ex-
change Rate Regimes, and Sovereign Default. This paper develops a dynamic stochastic open
economy model where default occurs in equilibrium to study the welfare impact of abandoning
a fixed exchange rate regime before a sovereign default crisis. The implications of abandoning
a fixed exchange rate are captured using two key features: sticky nominal wages and foreign-
currency denominated debt. Abandoning a fixed exchange rate allows governments to regain
monetary independence to pursue employment and output goals. However, the accompanying
nominal devaluation increases the external debt burden and the probability of default. Fixed
exchange rates, on the other hand, involve a loss of monetary independence but less volatil-
ity in the foreign-currency denominated external debt burden. Therefore, in the model, the
welfare impact of an exchange rate regime switch prior to sovereign default depends on two
countervailing effects: the output effect and the debt burden effect.
The second paper is titled: Default, Austerity, and their Relative Costs. This paper uses
the model developed in Cuadra et al. (2010) to find thresholds beyond which an increase in
austerity is less optimal than default as a method to deal with an unsustainable debt burden.
The third paper is titled: Does Capital Scarcity Matter and is joint with Anusha Chari and
Peter Blair Henry. This paper quantifies the welfare impact of a permanent increase in the level
of per capita income brought about by a temporary increase in the growth rate of GDP per
capita following capital account liberalization. In the immediate aftermath of liberalization,
and under a range of assumptions, differences between the autarkic and integrated equilibrium
consumption paths are large. Yet the welfare impact of these differences is small when using
infinite horizon consumption streams to compute welfare. The results suggest that a finite
iii
horizon framework may be more appropriate for evaluating the welfare consequences of economic
policy changes that induce temporary growth effects but have a permanent impact on the level
of per capita incomes.
iv
Dedication
For Narges, Khalil, Lama, Mohammad, and Amr.
v
Acknowledgments
So many people helped me bring this project to fruition. I am extremely grateful for the
guidance my advisor, Dr. Anusha Chari, has given me. I am also grateful for the excellent
advice I received from my committee members, Dr. Patrick Conway, Dr. Lutz Hendricks,
Dr. Riccardo Colacito, and Dr. Toan Phan. Also critical were conversations I had with Dr.
Leonardo Marteniz, Dr. Horacio Sapriza, and Dr. Emine Boz, I am extremely thankful for
their advice.
vi
Table of Contents
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1 Debt Denomination, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Sovereign Default . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.4 Foreign Creditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.5 Recursive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.2 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.3 Business Cycle Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.4 Welfare Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.5 Application to Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 The Relative Costs of Austerity and Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
vii
2.2 The Baseline Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.2 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.3 Foreign Lenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.4 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.1 Data and Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.2 Default and Austerity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.3 The cost of austerity relative to the cost of default . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.1 Haircut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.2 Productivity Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.3 Output Cost of Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 Does Capital Scarcity Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 An Infinite-Horizon Ramsey Model: The Gourinchas-Jeanne (2006) Formulation 82
3.3 Are Transitional Growth Effects Economically Meaningful? . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.1 The Magnitude of Welfare Gains in the Infinite Horizon . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.2 The Magnitude of Welfare Gains in the Finite Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1 Conditional Convergence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.2 Alternate Financial Contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
viii
A Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.1 Calculating µ: The Percent Change in Lifetime Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.2 Endogenizing the Exchange Rate Regime: A Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.1 Calculating the Welfare Effect of Austerity and Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
C Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
C.1 Quartiles by Capital to Output Ratio in 1995 for Non-OECD Countries . . . . . 100
C.2 Quartiles by Capital to Output Ratio in 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
C.3 Another Way to Think of Welfare in the Short Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Business Cycle Statistics for Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Parameters for Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Business Cycle Statistics in the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4 Welfare Change as a Percent of Aggregate Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5 Parameters for Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Welfare Change as a Percent of Aggregate Consumption–Greece . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1 Parameters for Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Benchmark model results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Welfare Gains Over Finite Horizons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Welfare Gains Using EP Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 Welfare Gains: Obstfeld-Rogoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5 Welfare Gains: 50 Year Debt Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
x
List of Figures
1.1 Bond Price Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.2 Default Space: Fixed Exchange Rate Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Default Space: Flexible Exchange Rate Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Argentina: Welfare Change per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Argentina: Histogram of Welfare Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.6 Greater Nominal Wage Stickiness: Welfare Change per State . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.7 Greater Nominal Wage Stickiness: Histogram of Welfare Change . . . . . . . . . 32
1.8 Less Nominal Wage Stickiness: Welfare Change per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.9 Less Nominal Wage Stickiness: Histogram of Welfare Change . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.10 Greater Probability of Regaining Access to International Credit Markets: Wel-
fare Change per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.11 Greater Probability of Regaining Access to International Credit Markets: His-
togram of Welfare Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.12 Lower Probability of Regaining Access to International Credit Markets: Welfare
Change per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.13 Lower Probability of Regaining Access to International Credit Markets: His-
togram of Welfare Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.14 Greece: Welfare Change per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.15 Greece: Histogram of Welfare Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1 Default Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2 Default Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Bond Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4 Austerity Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Austerity Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6 Future Borrowing – Bad Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
xi
2.7 Bond Price – Bad Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.8 Future Borrowing – Steady State Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.9 Bond Price – Steady State Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.10 Future Borrowing – Good Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.11 Bond Price – Good Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.12 Haircut – Default Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.13 Haircut – Threshold Debt and Austerity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.14 Volatility and Persistence – Default Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.15 Volatility and Persistence – Threshold Debt and Austerity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.16 Output Cost – Default Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.17 Output Cost – Threshold Debt and Austerity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1 Consumption Streams in Autarky and Integration: Ramsey Model . . . . . . . . 95
3.2 Consumption Streams in Autarky and Integration: GJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
C.1 Per period percentage change in utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
xii
Chapter 1
Debt Denomination, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Sovereign Default
1.1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis currently facing Greece is reminiscent of Argentina’s experience more
than a decade ago. Idiosyncrasies aside, the two cases are similar in important ways. Both
countries forfeited control over their monetary policy, Argentina by creating the currency board
pegging the Peso to the US Dollar, Greece by joining the European Monetary Union. Both
countries held sovereign debt in a currency whose value they did not control, Argentina in
the US Dollar, Greece in the Euro. Both countries experienced an appreciation in the real
exchange rate, Argentina because of the devaluation of the Brazilian Real, Greece because of
domestic inflation. In the case of Argentina, pressure on the Peso continued to mount and the
currency board was abandoned in 2001, causing the Peso/Dollar exchange rate to depreciate by
300% and the dollar-denominated debt burden to skyrocket. A few weeks after abandoning the
currency board, Argentina announced the suspension of payments on all its debt instruments
and entered a period of official sovereign default. Today, in similar vein, the debate continues
over whether Greece would be better able to deal with its sovereign debt crisis if it left the Euro
Zone and reinstated the Drachma.
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic open economy model where default occurs in
equilibrium to study the welfare impact of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime in the wake
of a sovereign default crisis. The model captures the implications of abandoning a fixed exchange
rate regime with two key features: sticky nominal wages and foreign currency denominated debt.
To see how sticky wages operate in the model, consider the following. Sticky nominal wages
lead to periods of unemployment under a fixed exchange rate regime, whereas – despite nominal
wage stickiness – full employment is ensured at all times under a flexible exchange rate regime.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a decline in productivity causes involuntary unemployment
because nominal wages are sticky downward. Since an economy supporting a fixed exchange
rate regime forfeits monetary independence, the government is unable to use monetary policy
to lower the real wage and increase employment and output. Once a government abandons its
fixed exchange rate regime, it regains monetary independence and allows the domestic currency
to depreciate, causing the real wage to decrease and employment to increase, thereby increasing
output.
When debt is denominated in a foreign currency, the sustainability of the debt burden
depends on the nominal exchange rate regime. Default occurs in more states of the economy
once a fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the
value of foreign currency denominated debt does not change when measured in the domestic
currency, meaning that the probability of default only depends on the productivity shock and
the outstanding debt burden. However, once the fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned, the
depreciated domestic currency causes the foreign currency denominated debt burden to increase
when measured in the domestic currency. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the probability
of default depends on the productivity shock, outstanding debt burden, and nominal exchange
rate. The added volatility from the nominal exchange rate increases the probability of default
and the cost of borrowing for an economy that abandons the fixed exchange rate regime.
Therefore, the welfare impact of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime in the wake of a
sovereign default crisis depends on two countervailing effects: the output effect and the debt
burden effect. When the government abandons a fixed exchange rate regime it regains monetary
independence and can use monetary policy to pursue full employment and increase output.
On the other hand, abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is accompanied by a nominal
devaluation, which increases the debt burden and the probability of default. Alternatively,
when a government supports a fixed exchange rate regime, its foreign currency denominated
debt burden is less volatile and the probability of default is lower, but monetary policy tools
are lost as a mechanism to affect employment.
To measure the welfare impact of abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime I consider
two scenarios. In the first scenario, the economy supports a fixed exchange rate regime until
2
it reaches a state where it must default. After the default, the economy abandons the fixed
exchange rate regime. In the second scenario, the economy abandons the fixed exchange rate
regime before a potential default occurs. I measure the welfare impact of a switch from the first
scenario to the second. The welfare impact depends on whether gaining monetary independence
and increasing output before a sovereign debt crisis will be welfare improving for an economy
despite causing the foreign currency debt burden to fluctuate with the nominal exchange rate,
which increases the probability of default and the cost of borrowing. I calibrate the model
to Argentina and find that switching the exchange rate regime in regions of the state space
where the default probability is very high reduces welfare or leaves it unchanged. Conditional
on outstanding debt, abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime in all other states leads to
improvements in welfare that are directly proportional to the existing level of the real wage. In
a version of the model calibrated to Greece, the welfare implications of leaving the monetary
union are similar and depend on default probabilities and the levels of outstanding debt and
real wages.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to incorporate the nominal exchange rate regime
and foreign currency denominated debt in an Eaton and Gersovitz-type model where sovereign
default occurs in equilibrium. Other papers that expand on the work of t (a) build their
conclusions around real debt that is denominated in units of domestic goods. u (g) and e (r) show
that their Eaton and Gersovitz-inspired models are successful in matching empirical regularities,
such as countercyclical interest rates and countercyclical net exports, in emerging markets. e
(u) and ( (i) detail the debt renegotiation process after a default occurs. n (e) endogenize output
and are able to explain its dynamics around default episodes. a (u) incorporate endogenous
fiscal policy. The real exchange rate plays a role in the model of m (u), which incorporates
indexed and non-indexed debt, and that of p (o), which adds trade. However, these models do
not allow one to examine the difference in dynamics under alternative nominal exchange rate
regimes. For a review of the broad literature on sovereign default, see n (a).
Although the model presented in this paper shares some features with currency crisis models,
the core objectives are different. Rather than to explain why currency crises occur, the objective
of this model is to examine the welfare impact of switching to a more flexible exchange rate
regime for countries with foreign currency denominated defaultable debt. Currency crisis models
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broadly aim to explain the causes and implications of a break from a managed exchange rate
regime. n (e) postulate that currency crises occur because of the rational expectations of
investors about the probability of a devaluation. Investors form these expectations based on
the evolution of foreign reserves in the central bank. r (u) postulate that the Asian currency
crises were caused by prospective deficits. They argue that markets anticipated that many
Asian governments would have large debt burdens in the future – because of their implicit
guarantees to bail out the financial sector – and consequently would be forced to print money
to cover their debt, undermining the value of their currency in the process. n (a) explains
currency crises using policy switching and the fiscal theory of the price level. h (g) use financial
frictions to explain currency crises. These currency crisis models do not include outright default
on debt, which is a main feature in my model.
While papers in the optimal exchange rate regime literature try to assess what exchange
rate regime is most suitable for an economy at a given time, the aim of this paper is more
specific. I evaluate whether abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime will be welfare increasing
for an economy that faces sovereign default. The rationale for why governments choose a
particular exchange rate regime is outside the scope of this paper. More broadly, the optimal
exchange rate regime literature addresses the implications different exchange rate regimes have
on an economy. a (r) details the costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate regimes under
different conditions. He notes that the optimal exchange rate regime will be different for different
countries and even different at different times in a particular country. c (i) highlight that there
is a close connection between the exchange rate regime and financial fragility. They examine
different hypotheses about the nature of the connection in order to explore implications for
the future of monetary policy and the international financial architecture. They conclude that
because of high capital mobility, having a fixed exchange rate and independent monetary policy
is impossible, and successfully floating is not likely o (o). According to c (i), the link between the
exchange rate and financial fragility can only be broken by developing deep domestic financial
markets or by dollarizing.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the quan-
titative analysis. Section 4 concludes.
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1.2 Model
Consider a small open economy with four agents: households, firms, the government, and foreign
lenders. Households consume both tradable and non-tradable goods, supply labor inelastically,
and value government spending. There are two kinds of firms: those that produce tradable
goods and those that produce non-tradable goods. Firms use labor to produce goods and take
wages as given. Nominal wages are sticky downward. Tradable and non-tradable firms face
technology shocks. The government finances spending by taxing tradables and non-tradables
and smooths its revenue by borrowing from foreign lenders. Foreign lenders are risk neutral.
Debt contracts are not enforceable, and the government can default at any time.
1.2.1 Households
Households consume both non-tradable and tradable goods and supply labor inelastically for
the production of both types of goods. They choose tradable and non-tradable consumption to
maximize lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(C(cNt , c
T
t ), G(g
T , gN )). (1.1)
Subject to the budget constraint:
Ptc
N
t + c
T
t ≤ (1− τ)(wtLTt + PtwtLNt + piT + PtpiN ), (1.2)
Pt is the relative price of non-tradable goods. From the intertemporal problem of the
household it is equal to
Pt =
UN (C(c
T
t , c
N
t ), G(g
T
t , g
N
t ))
UT (C(cTt , c
N
t ), G(g
T
t , g
N
t ))
.
E0 is the expectation at time zero of future utility. c
N
t and c
T
t are non-tradable and tradable
consumption. gNt and g
T
t are non-tradable and tradable government spending. 0 < β < 1 and τ
is a fixed tax rate on income from non-tradables and tradables. wt is the real wage denominated
in units of tradable goods. piT and piN are profits from operating tradable and non-tradable
firms. Tradable and non-tradable goods are produced using the labor input from households.
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Households supply their one unit of labor inelastically and divide this time between producing
tradable and non-tradable goods.
The period utility function is increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable
in all of its arguments:1
U(C(cTt , c
N
t ), G(g
T
t , g
N
t ) =
(CζtG
1−ζ
t )
1−σ
1− σ .
C(cTt , c
N
t ) is the constant elasticity of substitution aggregator:
C(cTt , c
N
t ) =
[
γ1/θ(cTt )
θ−1
θ + (1− γ)1/θ(cNt )
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
.
G(gTt , g
N
t ) is the government technology:
G(gTt , g
N
t ) = g
T
t + Ptg
N
t .
Purchasing power parity is assumed for tradable goods, since they are freely traded across
borders.2 The price of tradables in the foreign currency is normalized to one, making tradable
goods are the numeraire for this economy.
1.2.2 Firms
Tradable and non-tradable firms are perfectly competitive and use labor, LTt and L
N
t , as the
only input to produce goods. Labor is mobile across sectors. The production technology for
tradable and non-tradable firms is
Y it = F
i(Lit), (1.3)
where F i(Lit) = A
i
t(L
i
t)
α, i = T,N , and LTt + L
N
t ≤ 1.
Production is subject to technology shocks ATt and A
N
t . Each shock has a compact support
and follows a Markov process. More detail about the processes is provided in Section 3B.
1See a (u) and m (u) for models that also put government expenditures in the utility function of
households.
2This is a common simplifying assumption. See n (e), s (e), and m (u) for examples.
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Firms take wages and prices as given and choose labor to maximize profits. Labor demand
from tradable firms is defined implicitly by
F ′T (LTt ) = wt. (1.4)
Labor demand from non-tradable firms is defined implicitly by
PtF
′N (LNt ) = wt, (1.5)
where wt is the real wage and is denominated in units of tradable goods.
Nominal wages in this economy are sticky downward. Firms face opposition if they try to
decrease nominal wages past a certain point. This is represented by
Wt ≥ φWt−1, (1.6)
where Wt is in units of domestic currency and φ < 1 is the degree of wage stickiness.
Purchasing power parity holds in the tradable goods market, and the price of tradable goods
in the foreign currency is normalized to one which makes tradable goods the numeraire. Thus,
the wage stickiness condition can be represented by Itwt ≥ φIt−1wt−1, where It is the nominal
exchange rate defined as the amount of domestic currency needed to purchase one unit of foreign
currency. An increase in It signifies a depreciation.
Define the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency et =
It
It−1 and rearrange the wage
stickiness condition to get
wt ≥ φwt−1
et
. (1.7)
The dynamics of wages are as detailed by h (c) with the exception that I have both sectors
of the economy using labor for production.
Consider an economy under a fixed exchange rate regime where et = 1. Without loss of
generality, assume the economy is at full employment and receives an adverse shock to tradable
productivity. From (7) it is clear that an adverse shock would necessitate either a decrease
in the real wage wt or a decrease in employment L
T
t . Because the nominal wage is sticky
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downward, the real wage wt cannot be lower than a fraction φ of last period’s real wage wt−1.
Thus in order to accommodate the adverse shock, the amount of labor employed must decrease,
causing involuntary unemployment. Because of the nominal wage rigidity in the labor market,
households will only be able to work LTt + L
N
t ≤ 1 each period. Although households supply
labor inelastically, firms never display unfilled vacancies and are never forced to employ more
workers than desired. Thus, under a fixed exchange rate regime, an economy will experience
involuntary unemployment.
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the monetary authority chooses depreciation et such
that (7) always holds. After an adverse shock to productivity the currency depreciates such
that (7) binds making et = φ
wt−1
wt
. In other words, inflation allows the nominal wage today,
Wt, to be larger than or equal to φ times the nominal wage yesterday Wt−1, while decreasing
the real wage to the level that supports full employment. The lower value of domestic currency
makes the nominal wage worth less in real terms. Thus despite nominal wage stickiness, a
flexible exchange rate maintains full employment by allowing the real wage to adjust to adverse
shocks. Since the nominal wage is only sticky downward, it can adjust freely to beneficial
productivity shocks. Firms face no opposition if they increase the nominal wage. This means
that the depreciation rate will never be lower than et = 1, and under a flexible exchange rate
regime, et = max{1, φwt−1wt }.
1.2.3 Government
Governments trade one-period non-state-contingent foreign currency denominated bonds with
foreign creditors in order to smooth tax revenues. The volatility of tax revenues comes from
the volatility of the stochastic processes for tradable and non-tradable productivity. Since
government expenditures, Gt, are valued by households, smoothing government expenditures
also smooths household utility. Debt contracts are not enforceable, and the government can
default on its debt at any time. The cost of default is twofold. First, a government that defaults
loses access to international credit markets and can no longer smooth its tax revenue. Regaining
access to credit markets is exogenous and random. Each period, the economy has a probability
ψ of regaining access to international credit markets. The second cost of default is an exogenous
loss in tradable and non-tradable productivity. During periods of default, the economy loses a
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fraction θ of its tradable and non-tradable productivity.3
The recursive optimization problem of the government is
V (S,Z) = Max{vnd(S,Z), vd(S,Z)}. (1.8)
The government decides to default when the value of defaulting vd(S,Z) is greater than the
value of not defaulting vnd(S,Z). The state of the economy is fully described by four variables:
two endogenous state variables – outstanding debt (bond holdings) B and the real wage w
– and two exogenous state variables – non-tradable and tradable productivity, AN and AT .
S = {B,w} and Z = {AN , AT } are the vectors of endogenous and exogenous state variables.
In the following X and X ′ denote variable X in this period and the next period, respectively.
No default. If a country has access to international credit markets the government solves
vnd(S,Z) = Max
cT ,cN ,B′,w′
U(C(cT , cN ), G(gT , gN )) + β
∫
Z′
V (S′, Z ′)f(Z ′|Z)dZ ′, (1.9)
subject to the resource constraints and labor demand for tradable and non-tradable goods, and
the wage stickiness condition:
cT + gT = F T (LT )− q(S,Z)B′ + eB, (1.10)
cN + gN = FN (LN ), (1.11)
F ′T (LTt ) = wt,
PtF
′N (LNt ) = wt,
wt ≥ φwt−1
et
.
3The exogenous probability of regaining access to credit markets is standard in the literature. See
e (r), a (u), and n (e) for some examples. The models in Arellano and Cuadra et al. have exogenous
output costs in default.
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If the exchange rate regime is fixed, the depreciation rate of the domestic currency is
e = 1.
If the exchange rate regime is flexible, the depreciation rate of the domestic currency is
e = max{1, φ w
w′
}.
gT and gN are government expenditures on tradable and non-tradable goods and are de-
termined by the tax rate τ on tradable and non-tradable output, gT = τY T and gN = τY N .
Bt+1 is the value of bonds a government decides to issue or purchase in period t. When a gov-
ernment purchases bonds, Bt+1 > 0; when it issues bonds (i.e, when it borrows), Bt+1 < 0. B
is denominated in the foreign currency. In this model PPP holds in the tradable goods market
and the price of tradables in foreign currency is normalized to one. This means B is effectively
denominated in tradable goods.
−q(S′, Z) is the endogenously determined price of the tradable denominated bond (details
in Section 2D). If the government borrows (B′ < 0), it receives −q(S′, Z)B′ tradable goods
today and repays e′B′ tradable goods next period. The trade balance of the government this
period is −q(S′, Z)B′ + eB.
The value of outstanding debt in domestic currency at time t, Bt, depends on the deprecia-
tion rate of the domestic currency, et. To see why, suppose that in period t− 1 the government
borrowed Bt at a price of qt−1 and the nominal exchange rate was It−1. In period t − 1 the
value of issued debt in pesos is It−1Bt and the value in tradables is
It−1Bt
It−1 = Bt. Assuming a
peg will hold, the government expects to repay its debt in period t with Bt units of tradable
goods. Suppose that in period t the nominal exchange rate depreciates, It > It−1. In period t
the government must repay Bt units of tradables whose value in pesos is now ItBt. Because of
the depreciation at time t, the government will have to repay more units of tradables relative
to what it expected to repay in period t− 1. The value of its debt in tradable goods in period
t relative to period t− 1 expectations is ItBtIt−1 = etBt. When the domestic currency depreciates,
the burden of outstanding debt denominated in units of tradables increases. The ability of the
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government to repay its debt will depend not only on real output, but also on how much the
depreciation of the domestic currency affects the debt burden.
Default. If a country is in default the government solves
vd(S,Z) = Max
cT ,cN ,w′
U(C(cT , cN ), G(gT , gN ) + β
∫
Z′
(ψV (S′0, Z
′) + (1− ψ)vd(S′, Z ′))f(Z ′|Z)dZ ′,
(1.12)
subject to the resource constraints and labor demand for tradable and non-tradable goods, and
the wage stickiness condition:
cT + gT = (1− κ)F T (LT ), (1.13)
cN + gN = (1− κ)FN (LN ), (1.14)
(1− κ)F ′T (LTt ) = wt,
(1− κ)PtF ′N (LNt ) = wt,
wt ≥ φwt−1
et
.
If the exchange rate regime is fixed, the depreciation rate of the domestic currency is
e = 1.
If the exchange rate regime is flexible, the depreciation rate of the domestic currency is
e = max{1, φ w
w′
},
where S0 = {0, w}, ψ is the probability of regaining access to international financial markets,
and κ is the tradable and non-tradable productivity loss during default.
Given an endogenous state S = {B,w}, there is a set of exogenous state variables Z = {AN ,
AT } for which default is the optimal choice. This set is defined as follows:
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Γ(S) = {Z ∈ Ψ|vd(S,Z) > vnd(S,Z)}.
Thus, at any given state S the probability of default is
δ(S′, Z) =
∫
Γ(S′)
f(Z ′|Z) dZ ′. (1.15)
If the default set Γ(S) is empty, the probability of default, δ is zero. Conversely, if the
default set is the entire space Z, the probability of default is one.
1.2.4 Foreign Creditors
Foreign creditors are risk neutral and choose Bt+1 to maximize expected profits Π.
Π(St+1, Zt) =

qtBt+1 − 11+rfBt+1 if Bt+1 ≥ 0,
(1−δ(St+1,Zt))
1+rf
(−Bt+1)− qt(−Bt+1) if Bt+1 < 0,
where the probability of default is endogenously determined as in (15) and rf is the risk-free
interest rate.
Since foreign creditors are risk neutral, Π(St+1, Zt) = 0 and the price of bonds is
qt(St+1, Zt) =

1
1+rf
if Bt+1 ≥ 0,
(1−δ(St+1,Zt))
1+rf
if Bt+1 < 0.
Foreign creditors hold bonds denominated in tradable goods; as such, they are not directly
affected by exchange rate risk. The only risk foreign creditors account for is the risk of default
in the debtor country. Nevertheless, since debt is denominated in foreign currency, the nominal
exchange rate affects the probability of default. As a result, foreign creditors take on exchange
rate risk indirectly, because the denomination of debt affects the probability of default.
1.2.5 Recursive Equilibrium
Definition 1. Equilibrium in this economy is defined as the set of policy functions for (i)
employed labor LT , LN and tradable and non-tradable consumption cT , cN ; (ii) government
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issuance (purchase) of bonds B′ and the default set Γ(B); (iii) wages w′ and the depreciation
rate e and (iv) the price function for bonds q(S′, Z) such that:
1. If the exchange rate regime is fixed,
e = 1.
2. If the exchange rate regime is flexible,
et = max{1, φwt−1
wt
}.
3. After learning the shocks to tradable and non-tradable productivity, AT and AN , the social
planner determines wages w′ and employs tradable and non-tradable labor, LT and LN .
4. After allocating consumption to households, taking the exchange rate and the bond price
function as given, the social planner issues bonds and decides whether to default according
to its maximization problem.
5. Bond prices are determined from the probability of default, which is derived from the
default set. Bond prices are consistent with foreign creditors’ zero profit expectations.
1.2.6 Discussion
The difference between a fixed exchange rate regime and a flexible exchange rate regime can
be summarized by the effect each has on debt and employment. Under a fixed exchange rate
regime, the value of outstanding debt eB is not affected by the depreciation rate, since e = 1.
Thus the affordability of outstanding debt only fluctuates due to changes in technology shocks
in the tradable and non-tradable sector. As a consequence, the probability of default is lower
than it would be under a flexible exchange rate regime, and the price of bonds is higher.
Employment under a fixed exchange regime is no higher than it would be under a flexible
exchange rate regime. Because of downward stickiness in the nominal wage, any negative shock
to technology will cause involuntary unemployment and decrease output.
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the value of outstanding debt eB fluctuates with
changes in the depreciation rate, e = max{1, φ ww′ }. This makes the debt burden more volatile
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than it would be under the fixed exchange rate regime. In states of the world where a depreci-
ation occurs, the outstanding debt burden may suddenly become unaffordable. This volatility
in the debt burden makes default occur in more states of the world; as a consequence the prob-
ability of default is higher than under the fixed exchange rate regime. The higher probability
of default leads to a lower price for bonds.
Labor is always fully employed under a flexible exchange rate regime, making output higher
than it would be under a fixed exchange rate regime. After an adverse shock to productiv-
ity, currency depreciation helps bypass the downward rigidity in nominal wages by causing a
decrease in the real wage thereby increasing employment and output.
Technology shocks are the only shocks the economy in this model faces. In the context of a
small open economy, one can think of an economy facing other kinds of shocks, such as world
interest rate shocks or terms of trade shocks. The main results of this paper will not change if I
included shocks to the world interest rate or terms of trade, but the mechanism through which
the results occur would be different. For example, in the case of a shock to the world interest
rate, an adverse shock will make the outstanding debt burden less affordable for all possible
shocks to technology. This higher cost of borrowing will increase the risk of default in bad states
when the desire to smooth consumption is greatest. In contrast, a beneficial shock to the world
interest rate would make borrowing cheaper and would decrease the risk of default. A terms of
trade shock would have the same effect on the cost of borrowing and the probability of default.
I exclude these other types of shocks from the model because of the curse of dimensionality.4
The central bank in this model is non-standard. Under a fixed exchange rate regime it
supports the fixed exchange rate and under the flexible exchange rate regime it supports full
employment. Generally, price stability is a key objective of a central bank. Adding price
stability to the objective function of the central bank in this model would mean that under
a flexible exchange rate regime the bank would not pursue full employment if it causes an
increased volatility in the price level that cancels the benefit of the increased employment. A
4The model is solved using value function iteration because the social planner’s objective function
is the Max function. The value function of the economy is evaluated for every combination of state
variables. When more state variables are introduced into the model, the number of states for which the
value function of the economy must be computed increases exponentially.
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central bank that cares about both unemployment and price stability would evaluate the benefit
of increased employment against the cost of higher price volatility to implement policies that
increase welfare. This means that when an economy has a flexible exchange rate regime, its
debt burden would not fluctuate as much. Thus, the cost of borrowing would be lower than that
in the flexible exchange rate regime in my model, but higher than that in the fixed exchange
rate regime in my model. Additionally, employment would be lower than that in the flexible
exchange rate regime in my model, but higher than that in the fixed exchange rate regime in
my model. I leave making modifications to the central bank for future work.
In the model described in this paper, the decision to default is endogenous while the decision
to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime is exogenous. Imposing the exchange rate regime
switch exogenously is enough for the purpose of this paper: to capture the welfare effect of
abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime in an economy that could default on its foreign currency
denominated debt. This is because I test, in each state, whether or not abandoning the fixed
exchange rate regime would lead to welfare gains. It is true, however, that keeping the exchange
rate regime decision exogenous ignores interesting dynamics regarding currency speculation. I
leave endogenizing the exchange rate regime for future work and include a preliminary discussion
in Appendix B.
1.3 Quantitative Analysis
1.3.1 Data
The default of Argentina in 2001 was one of the largest in history. On December 24, the
Argentine government defaulted on $100 billion of privately owned and official bilateral debt.
The size of the default was 38% of output in 2001. The cost of the default to Argentina and
its creditors was also significant. From the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2002, the
nominal exchange rate depreciated by 300% and real output decreased by 16%. In the process
of debt restructuring after the default, creditors lost 40% of their claims on average u (t). The
government of Argentina remains excluded in 2013 from issuing debt in international financial
markets.
Table 1.1 presents some business cycle statistics for Argentina from the first quarter of 1993
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Table 1.1: Business Cycle Statistics for Argentina
Fixed Flexible
std(x) corr(x, T ) corr(x,N) std(x) corr(x, Y T ) corr(x, Y N )
Interest rate spread 7.4765 -0.4446 -0.3701 24.6990 -0.3346 -0.6269
Exchange rate depreciation · · · 18.25 -0.3531 -0.2073
Trade balance 1.5154 -0.4238 -0.4723 3.0288 -0.2912 -0.6320
Notes - Data are quarterly. Standard deviations are reported in percentages. Interest rate spreads are
calculated as the difference between the EMBI for Argentina and the US 5-year Treasury rate. The
trade balance is reported as a percent of output. Tradable and non-tradable output are log filtered with
a linear trend. All series are HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
to the second quarter of 2011. Interest rate spreads are calculated using the difference between
the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) for Argentina and the US 5-year Treasury rate.
EMBI data from 1993 to 2000 are constructed from the dataset in u (e), and the rest of the
time series are from the Ministry of Finance of Argentina (MECON). Data on the US Treasury
rate are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Data on the nominal exchange
rate and consumer price indexes are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the
International Monetary Fund. The rest of the data are from MECON. The trade balance is
reported as a percent of output. Tradable and non-tradable output are measured in 1993 prices
and are log filtered with a linear trend. Following m (u), tradable output is computed using
output in the manufacturing, agriculture, and energy sectors. The fixed exchange rate regime
spans from the first quarter of 1993 to the last quarter of 2001. The flexible exchange rate
regime spans the rest of the time series, from the first quarter of 2002 to the second quarter of
2011.
The interest rate spread is negatively correlated to tradable and non-tradable production
under both exchange rate regimes, but the volatility is much larger under the flexible exchange
rate regime. The trade balance is negatively correlated to tradable and non-tradable production
under both exchange rate regimes. The volatility of the trade balance is larger under the flexible
exchange rate regime owing to volatility in the exchange rate.
1.3.2 Calibration
I solve the model numerically to evaluate its quantitative predictions of default events under
different exchange rate regimes. The numerical solution also assesses the ability of the model
to predict business cycle statistics for the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, trade
balance, and tradable and non-tradable output. The dynamics are compared under both fixed
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Table 1.2: Parameters for Argentina
Value Target statistics
Risk aversion σ 2 Standard RBC value
Discount factor β 0.98 Standard RBC value
Elasticity of substitution θ 0.5 u (e)
Weight of cT in CES γ 0.5 CPI equal to one in the steady state
Weight of C in utility ζ 0.81 1 minus the ratio of public to private C
Tax rate τ 0.12 Average tax revenue % GDP
Productivity loss in default κ 0.01 Default frequency (4 times every 100 years)
Probability of reentry ψ 0.1 Length of exclusion (3 years)
Nominal wage rigidity φ 0.873 Unemployment rate (14%)
AR(1) coefficient of T productivity shock ρA
T
0.0776 Tradable data
AR(1) coefficient of N productivity shock ρA
N
0.8119 Non-tradable data
Std. dev. of T productivity sock εA
T
ηAT 0.0941 Tradable data
Std. dev. of N productivity sock εA
N
ηAN 0.0412 Non-tradable data
Risk-free interest rate r∗ 0.01 US 90-day T-bill
and flexible exchange rate regimes.
Table 1.2 summarizes the parameter values used in the computational analysis of Argentina.
The values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the discount factor are standard in
business cycle studies. The elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods
is set to 0.5, a value close to the estimate of 0.48 in u (e). The weight of consumption in the
utility function, 81%, is set according to the average ratio of private to public consumption in
data from MECON.
The tax rate, 12%, is set to match the average total tax revenue as a percent of GDP for
Argentina using data from The World Bank’s economic indicators. Productivity loss during
default is set close to the frequency of default for Argentina, 3 times in the last 100 years. The
risk-free interest rate is set to 1%, roughly the rate on a US Treasury bill.5 The probability
of reentry is set to 10%, meaning that after default a country is excluded from international
financial markets for 3 years on average.6 The nominal wage rigidity is set to match the
average unemployment rate for Argentina from 1993 to 2009 using data from The World Bank’s
economic indicators.
5This is similar to i (r), u (g), and a (u).
6Argentina has experienced longer periods of exclusion. n (e) calibrate to match 2 years of exclusion
for Argentina and a (u) calibrate to match 2.5 years of exclusion for Mexico, both undershooting actual
exclusion periods.
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Table 1.3: Business Cycle Statistics in the Model
Fixed Flexible
std(x) corr(x, Y T ) corr(x, Y N ) std(x) corr(x, Y T ) corr(x, Y N )
Interest rate spread 0.0438 -0.0899 -0.0841 654.8421 0.1243 0.0070
Exchange rate depreciation · · · 3.8731 -0.4349 -0.1869
Trade balance 3.6816 -0.8151 -0.7871 3.2828 -0.2436 -0.0926
Notes - Standard deviations are reported in percentages. The trade balance is reported as a percent of
total output. All series are HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
The shocks to tradable and non-tradable productivity, Ait where i = {T,N} are log-normal
AR(1) processes:
log(Ait) = ρ
Ai log(Ait−1) + ε
Ai
t , (1.16)
with E[εA
i
] = 0 and E[(εA
i
)2] = η2
Ai
. The values for ρA
i
and ηAi are estimated using quarterly
data on tradable and non-tradable output from MECON from 1993 to 2011. Following a (u),
the shocks are then discretized into a Markov chain using the quadrature-based procedure in u
(a).
1.3.3 Business Cycle Implications
Table 1.3 shows some moments from the model. Tradable output is negatively correlated with
the interest rate spread under the fixed exchange rate regime, as in the data for Argentina. Like
the data, the volatility of the interest rate spread is also higher under the flexible exchange rate
regime. Tradable and non-tradable output are positively correlated to the interest rate spread
under the flexible exchange rate regime. This is because in the model, increases in output are
driven by a depreciation in the exchange rate, which increases the probability of default and
causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Tradable and non-tradable output are negatively
correlated to the trade balance; the government borrows more when output is lower.
In this model, under a flexible exchange rate regime the probability of default is higher
and the price of bonds is lower than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Figure 1.1 shows
the price of bonds, q(S′, Z), faced by an economy with a flexible exchange rate regime and an
economy with a fixed exchange rate regime. Given a state of exogenous shocks Z = {AN , AT }
and real wage w, the price of bonds under a fixed exchange rate regime is larger than or equal
to the bond price under a flexible exchange rate regime. This makes borrowing under a flexible
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exchange rate regime more expensive than borrowing under a fixed exchange rate regime. The
price of bonds, q(S′, Z), is endogenously determined and is inversely related to the probability
of default, δ. Thus, an economy with a flexible regime is more susceptible to default in bad
times since rolling over debt becomes more costly.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the government defaults in fewer states than in a flexible
exchange rate regime. The shaded regions in figures 1.2 and 1.3 indicate the states {S,Z} where
default is the optimal policy.7 The default space for the fixed exchange rate regime (figure 1.2)
is smaller than the default space for the flexible exchange rate regime (figure 1.3). Default risk
coming from domestic currency depreciation is smaller under a fixed exchange rate regime than
a flexible exchange rate regime. With a fixed exchange rate regime both creditors and debtors
are certain that the nominal exchange rate will be constant e = 1, thus the sustainability of
debt will only depend on fluctuations in the productivity of tradables and non-tradables.8 In
contrast, the sustainability of debt in a flexible exchange rate regime depends on both the
fluctuations in tradable and non-tradable productivity and on the depreciation of the currency.
1.3.4 Welfare Analysis
The welfare impact from abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime depends on how the depre-
ciated currency affects employment and the debt burden. Abandoning a fixed exchange rate
regime before default allows the depreciation rate to decrease the real wage, overcoming the
stickiness of nominal wages. As a result, employment and output will increase, helping the econ-
omy repay its debt. At the same time, however, depreciation increases the value of outstanding
debt and decreases the price of bonds. Higher outstanding debt and lower prices for newly
issued bonds increase the debt burden and the probability of default. The welfare impact of
abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime before default depends on whether the depreciation’s
positive effect on employment outweighs its negative effect on debt.
The exchange rate regime switch is exogenous in this model, thus the welfare calculations
7The edges of the default spaces in figures 1.2 and 1.3 are not monotonic because of the arrangement
of the states of shocks to tradable productivity, non-tradable productivity, and wages, along the axis
titled ‘Z’. For each level for the wage and each shock to non-tradable productivity, I list the grid for the
shock to tradable productivity. The size of the axis titled ‘Z’ is the product of the size of the grids for
tradable productivity shocks, non-tradable productivity shocks, and wages.
8Runs on the currency are not possible in this model. If they were, the probability of default would
include that risk.
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carried out here are a counterfactual exercise. There is no mechanism within the model by
which the government can switch the exchange rate regime.
For an economy that supports a fixed exchange rate regime, I compare welfare in two
scenarios. In scenario A the government waits until a default episode to abandon a fixed
exchange rate regime, while in scenario B the government abandons the fixed exchange rate
regime before the default. The welfare impact, µ, is the consumption equivalent variation
between scenario A and scenario B. µ is calculated as the percent change in lifetime aggregate
consumption C(cT , cN ) that is required to equate expected welfare in scenario A to that in
scenario B:
EA0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1 + µ)C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt) = E
B
0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt),
µ =
[
EB0
∑∞
t=0β
tU(C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt)
EA0
∑∞
t=0β
tU(C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt)
] 1
ζ(1−σ)
.
Figure 1.4 shows the change in welfare that a government can expect when it abandons a
fixed exchange rate regime given the state of outstanding debt and existing wages {B,w}. At
each state the government faces a tree of possible future realizations for each scenario. µ is the
percent increase in lifetime aggregate consumption that is required to make the government
indifferent between the expected utility in the two scenarios.9 For Argentina, a welfare increase
of around 20% occurs most often in the {B,w} state space (figure 1.5).
Figure 1.4 has two distinct regions. The first region is one in which µ is zero or negative.
In this region of the state space, default is the optimal policy under both fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes. If an economy is in a state where it will almost surely default the next
period under either regime, there is very little difference in welfare between abandoning the
exchange rate regime or not. This is because under scenario A the economy abandons the fixed
exchange rate regime after a default occurs which means the switch will occur anyway.
The second region consists of the rest of the state space. Here, controlling for outstanding
debt, the welfare effect of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is positive and directly
proportional to the existing level of the real wage. This is because the higher the state of
real wages, the more likely unemployment will be high in the next period. And the higher
9See Appendix for details on the calculation of µ in figure 1.4.
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unemployment is, the more welfare increasing abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime to
implement full employment will be.
In order to examine how sensitive the results for µ are to parameters related to default and
unemployment, I consider alternate values for the probability of regaining access to international
financial markets after a default, ψ, and the nominal wage rigidity, φ. Figure 1.6 plots µ when
the nominal wage is more sticky, φ = 0.973. The gains from switching in region two are higher
than those in figure 1.4 because the unemployment rate is higher the more sticky nominal wages
are. The higher the unemployment rate, the larger the welfare gain from abandoning a fixed
exchange rate regime to implement full employment. Conversely, figure 1.8 plots µ when the
nominal wage is less sticky, φ = 0.773. The gains from switching here are lower than they are
in figure 1.4 because the unemployment rate declines when nominal wages are less sticky, which
lowers the benefit of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime to implement full employment.
Figure 1.10 plots µ when the probability of regaining access to international financial markets
after a default is higher, ψ = 0.2. A higher probability of reentry decreases the costs of default
and makes default the optimal policy in more states of the world under both fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes. As a consequence, the region of the state space where the decision to
default coincides under both exchange rate regimes is larger. This in turn makes the region
where the change in welfare is negative or nearly zero larger. Figure 1.12 shows that the
opposite is true when the probability of regaining access to international financial markets
is lower, ψ = 0.05. Default does not occur under this parametrization; thus, switching the
exchange rate regime leads to welfare gains in all states.
The welfare effect of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is influenced by the degree of
nominal wage stickiness and the probability of regaining access to international credit markets
after a default. The more sticky wages are, the higher the unemployment rate and the larger
the gains in welfare from abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime. The greater the probability
of regaining access to international credit markets, the lower the cost of default and the more
states where default is optimal, thus increasing the number of states where abandoning a fixed
exchange rate regime leaves welfare unchanged or deceases it.
In addition to the state of the economy at the switch, the timing of the switch is another
factor that determines whether or not the employment effect outweighs the debt burden effect.
The earlier the switch from the time of default, the sooner the economy can benefit from
increased employment, which increases tradable and non-tradable output. But the larger the
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Table 1.4: Welfare Change as a Percent of Aggregate Consumption
Timing of Switch Mean µ Std µ Max µ Min µ Percent of Positive µ
1 quarter before default 0.43% 0.80 2.94% -0.19% 39.34%
2 quarters before default 1.23% 2.00 9.38% -2.37% 50.82%
3 quarters before default 2.30% 2.66 12.18% -0.26% 80.33%
4 quarters before default 3.18% 3.10 13.18% -0.92% 98.91%
5 quarters before default 4.17% 3.82 17.78% -0.73% 98.91%
6 quarters before default 4.72% 4.48 20.83% -1.04% 99.45%
Notes - I simulate the model economy under scenario A 10,000 times. For each simulation under scenario
A, I have a corresponding simulation under scenario B. For simulations under scenario A where default
occurs, I calculate µ for the corresponding pair of simulations from scenarios A and B.
state of the debt burden at the time of the switch, the more likely a default episode will occur
after the switch. Depreciation increases the outstanding debt burden, and the lower price of
bonds makes rolling over debt more difficult.
Table 1.4 shows values of µ calculated under perfect foresight. Each µ represents the percent
change in consumption required to equate welfare from a stream of realizations under scenario
A to the alternate stream that would have occurred under scenario B.10 On average, the earlier
the switch to a flexible exchange rate regime, the larger the average gain in welfare (Mean µ),
reflecting the welfare increasing affect of having full employment for more periods. The worst
case scenario for welfare cost (Min µ) also tends to be larger the earlier the switch, reflecting
that the increased volatility in the debt burden increases episodes of default. Generally, the
exchange rate regime switch is highly likely to result in an increase in welfare (Percent of
Positive µ).
The generally positive welfare gains recorded by this model suggest that in abandoning a
fixed exchange rate regime, the effect of implementing full employment generally outweighs the
increased likelihood of default and higher borrowing costs. In my model, the stability of the
currency is never in question, which excludes speculation on the currency and the possibility
of currency crises. Including currency crises is likely to change the welfare analysis. When a
country is under a flexible exchange rate regime, volatility in the exchange rate coming from
speculators is likely to exacerbate the already high borrowing cost and high probability of
default. I leave this extension for future work.
10See Appendix for details on the calculation of µ in table 1.4.
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Table 1.5: Parameters for Greece
Value Target statistics
Risk aversion σ 2 Standard RBC value
Discount factor β 0.98 Standard RBC value
Elasticity of substitution θ 0.5 u (e)
Weight of cT in CES γ 0.5 CPI equal to one in the steady state
Weight of C in utility ζ 0.75 1 minus the ratio of public to private C
Tax rate τ 0.23 Average tax revenue % GDP
Productivity loss in default δ 0.01 Default frequency (2 times every 100 years)
Probability of reentry ψ 0.18 Length of exclusion (2 years)
Nominal wage rigidity φ 0.927 Unemployment rate (10%)
AR(1) coefficient of T productivity shock ρA
T
0.0289 Tradable data
AR(1) coefficient of N productivity shock ρA
N
0.4013 Non-tradable data
Std. dev. of T productivity sock εA
T
ηAT 0.0535 Tradable data
Std. dev. of N productivity sock εA
N
ηAN 0.0207 Non-tradable data
Risk-free interest rate r∗ 0.01 US 90-day T-bill
1.3.5 Application to Greece
I also calibrate my model to Greece in order to examine the welfare impact of leaving the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union. Greece belongs to the Euro Zone, effectively under a fixed exchange
rate regime, and is currently facing a debt sustainability crisis. Much like Argentina, countries
that belong to the European Monetary Union face the trade-off specified in my model. Leaving
the monetary union would allow Greece to regain monetary independence to pursue higher em-
ployment and output, but the accompanying nominal devaluation of its new domestic currency
would increase its Euro-denominated debt burden and increase its probability of defaulting.
Table 1.5 summarizes the parameter values used in the computational analysis of Greece.
The weight of consumption in the utility function is set to match the average ratio of public to
private consumption in Greece using data from the OECD. The tax rate is set according to the
average total tax revenue as a percent of GDP for Greece using data from The World Bank’s
economic indicators. Productivity loss during default is set to match a frequency of default of
2%. This captures the idea that though default is an option for Greece, it is unlikely to be
exercised. The probability of reentry is set to 18% to match the exclusion period of 2 years,
roughly the amount of time Iceland was excluded from international financial markets. The
nominal wage rigidity is set to match the average unemployment rate for Greece using data
from The World Bank’s economic indicators. Tradable and non-tradable productivity shocks
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Table 1.6: Welfare Change as a Percent of Aggregate Consumption–Greece
Timing of Switch Mean µ Std µ Max µ Min µ Percent of Positive µ
1 quarter before default 0.42% 0.51 1.94% -0.13% 63.79%
2 quarters before default 0.73% 0.88 4.35% -2.57% 75.57%
3 quarters before default 1.53% 1.11 6.95% -1.93% 97.13%
4 quarters before default 2.10% 1.47 8.10% -1.38% 98.56%
5 quarters before default 2.54% 1.87 9.68% -4.04% 96.55%
6 quarters before default 2.91% 2.09 11.42% -1.28% 97.13%
Notes - I simulate the model economy under scenario A 10,000 times. For each simulation under scenario
A, I have a corresponding simulation under scenario B. For simulations under scenario A where default
occurs, I calculate µ for the corresponding pair of simulations from scenarios A and B.
follow the AR(1) process in (16), and the parameters are calibrated using quarterly data on
tradable and non-tradable output from the OECD. As in the case with Argentina, following a
(u), these shocks are discretized using the quadrature-based procedure in u (a). The remaining
calibrations are standard in the literature and are as reported in table 1.2. All data for Greece
are reported for the period spanning 2001 to 2010, from its adoption of the Euro to the present.
Figure 1.14 shows that the gains from welfare are generally lower for Greece than they
are for Argentina. For Greece, a welfare increase of around 10% occurs most often in the
state space (figure 1.15). Like Argentina, in the region of the state space where default is the
optimal policy under both exchange rate regimes, abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime
will either decrease welfare or leave it unchanged. In the rest of the state space, conditional on
outstanding debt, abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime leads to a gain in welfare that is
directly proportional to the existing level of real wages.
The lower welfare gains experienced by Greece are due to two differences from Argentina’s
case. The first is that the average unemployment rate is smaller for Greece, so the gains from
implementing full employment after abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime are smaller.
The second is that the probability of Greece regaining access to international credit markets is
higher, lowering both the cost of defaulting and the gains to welfare from a switch. Changes
in µ for Greece under different calibrations for the nominal wage rigidity and probability of
reentry are the same as those for Argentina.11 The welfare gains are higher the more sticky
wages are and the less likely reentry to international credit markets after a default.
Like the case for Argentina, the representation in figure 8 ignores the timing of default in
11Results for alternate calibrations for Greece available upon request.
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the welfare calculation. Table 1.6 shows the perfect foresight results for the welfare gain, µ. As
Argentina’s experience indicates, abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime generally leads to
welfare gain that becomes larger on average but more volatile the earlier the switch.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a model that can be used to assess the welfare impact of switching
to a flexible exchange rate regime before a default episode. The two key elements in the model
are nominal wages that are sticky downward and foreign currency denominated debt. The
welfare impact from switching to a flexible exchange rate regime depends on how the depreciated
currency affects employment and the debt burden. I calibrate the model to Argentina and
find that switching the exchange rate regime in regions of the state space where the default
probability is very high reduces welfare or leaves it unchanged. Conditional on outstanding
debt, in all other states, abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime leads to improvements in
welfare that are directly proportional to the existing level of the real wage. In a version of the
model calibrated to Greece, the welfare implications of leaving the monetary union are similar
and depend on default probabilities and the level of outstanding debt and real wages.
The welfare effect of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is influenced by the degree of
nominal wage stickiness and the probability of regaining access to international credit markets
after a default. The more sticky wages are, the higher the unemployment rate and the larger
the gains in welfare from abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime. The greater the probability
of regaining access to international credit markets, the lower the cost of default and the more
states where default is optimal, thus increasing the number of states where abandoning a fixed
exchange rate regime leaves welfare unchanged or deceases it.
The model in this paper does not have amplifying phenomena that are observed in cases
of sovereign default in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. This model abstracts from
growth and currency crashes. The benefit from increased employment after an exchange rate
depreciation does not increase the production possibilities for an economy. Additionally, the
exchange rate regime switch does not cause panic in financial markets, and it is always assumed
that the government is in complete control of its peg and its flexible exchange rate. These two
elements influence the welfare impact of switching to a flexible exchange rate regime before
default. Exploring the implications these amplifying effects have on welfare is an interesting
avenue for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Bond Price Schedule
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Figure 1.2: Default Space: Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
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Figure 1.3: Default Space: Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
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Figure 1.4: Argentina: Welfare Change per State
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Figure 1.5: Argentina: Histogram of Welfare Change
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Figure 1.6: Greater Nominal Wage Stickiness: Welfare Change per State
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Figure 1.7: Greater Nominal Wage Stickiness: Histogram of Welfare Change
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Figure 1.8: Less Nominal Wage Stickiness: Welfare Change per State
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Figure 1.9: Less Nominal Wage Stickiness: Histogram of Welfare Change
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Figure 1.10: Greater Probability of Regaining Access to
International Credit Markets: Welfare Change per State
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Figure 1.11: Greater Probability of Regaining Access to In-
ternational Credit Markets: Histogram of Welfare Change
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Figure 1.12: Lower Probability of Regaining Access to In-
ternational Credit Markets: Welfare Change per State
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Figure 1.13: Lower Probability of Regaining Access to In-
ternational Credit Markets: Histogram of Welfare Change
−20−10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100110120
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
mu
38
Figure 1.14: Greece: Welfare Change per State
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Figure 1.15: Greece: Histogram of Welfare Change
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Chapter 2
The Relative Costs of Austerity and Default
2.1 Introduction
Today, several advanced economies are grappling with high debt burdens and the threat to debt
sustainability that they present. These economies, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, have
chosen to combat their high debt burdens by implementing austerity measures, a combination
of decreasing government spending and increasing taxes. Austerity measures are implemented
in order to restore debt sustainability. The reasoning is that austerity measures increase the
government’s ability to repay its debt buy increasing government revenue. However, austerity
policies have also been associated with declines in output which cause the debt to GDP ratio to
increase, keeping an economy on an unsustainable debt path despite efforts to decrease the debt
burden. The severity of austerity measures that have been implemented has spurred debate
among policymakers about when austerity is a good tool for combating a debt sustainability
crisis and when it is counter productive.
Using the quantitative dynamic stochastic open economy model developed by a (u), this
paper examines when austerity measures are no longer productive in combating an unsustain-
able debt burden and default becomes the better alternative. The model in a (u) is suitable
for evaluating the limit of the usefulness of austerity measures because it includes two main
features. First is the option to default. The government issues non-state contingent bonds and
can chose to renege on repayments at any time. This means that default is always an option
for the government, and it occurs as an equilibrium outcome. Thus, when austerity measures
are taken within the model, they are preferred to the option of default. Second is distorting
taxes. The government sets distorting taxes on consumption and uses the tax revenues along
with proceeds from the bonds for government spending, which is valued by the representative
agent. When the government is facing debt sustainability issues, increasing the tax rate has
two countervailing effects. On one hand a higher tax rate allows the government to increase its
revenue to repay its outstanding debt burden. On the other hand, the higher tax rate decreases
the incentive to supply labor and hence, decreases output.
The International Monetary Fund generally assesses the sustainability of an economy’s debt
burden using its Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). The DSA framework relies heavily on
assessing the viability of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Using projections
for output growth, interest rate spreads, and other macroeconomic variables, the DSA can
prescribe the change in taxes and government spending that is required to keep debt on a
sustainable path. The DSA explicitly assumes that the government will always choose to honor
its debt contracts. The possibility that a government may default on its debt burden is not
addressed within the DSA framework.
The model in a (u) is one of strategic default. It belongs to the class of models that expand
on the seminal work of t (a), a theoretical model of international borrowing where default is
a strategic choice that occurs in equilibrium.1 a (u) endogenize their distorting taxes which
allows for the study of austerity policies in times of an unsustainable debt burden. Because
default is strategic in the a (u) model, when austerity occurs it is preferred to defaulting as a
way to deal with the outstanding debt burden. However, when default is the optimal choice,
austerity, any amount of it, will not be implemented. The question is: in what environments
does austerity no longer become a useful way to deal with a debt sustainability crisis?
In contrast to the DSA framework, the model in a (u) has micro foundations and is built
on the principle of maximizing the utility of infinitely lived agents. The DSA finds a value for
the primary balance adjustment needed to make the debt level sustainable, but it has nothing
to say about whether or not the government will make that adjustment. The a (u) framework
treats the government as a welfare optimizing entity that decides whether or not to default on
its outstanding debt. Their model has something to say about the willingness of a government
to make the primary balance adjustment necessary to avert a default. In practice, countries
never default purely for strategic reasons t (o). However, incorporating the willingness of a
country to repay its debt enables a richer discussion of debt sustainability. In particular, it
allows for a clearer articulation of the costs and benefits of austerity relative to the option to
default.
1There has been a recent resurgence of interest in models of strategic default that expand on the
work of t (a). See u (g), e (r), p (o), e (u), and ( (i) for examples.
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This paper is related to the broad literature on optimal fiscal policy, see r (a)and a (h) and
the references therein for a comprehensive review of that literature. g (n) approaches optimal
fiscal policy by finding an environment within the neoclassical model that can support a non-
variant tax rate. An invariant tax rate is socially optimal because when taxes are distortional,
any increase will cause social welfare to decline. He finds the optimal maturity structure for
non-state contingent bonds that would support a non-variant tax rate: issuing long term debt
while investing in short term assets. In this paper, I do not attempt to design the fiscal structure
or the debt structure of the economy, but to examine what amount of austerity an economy
chooses to implement before it prefers to default.
More recently, there has been a debate about the optimal way for high debt Euro Zone
economies to make their fiscal adjustments. a (l) emphasize that it is important not to front
load the fiscal adjustment, because the negative effect on output would cause the debt to GDP
ratio to remain large, or even increase, rendering the austerity measures self defeating. They also
highlight the importance of anchoring future expectations of the government’s fiscal balances
by making long term plans for deficit reduction. In their opinion, focusing on short run crisis
control is not a sufficient way to deal with a debt sustainability. In addition to those short term
measures, long term plans for deficit reduction must be made to anchor expectations. This
emphasis on anchoring expectations for the governments deficit is also reflected in e (l) where
they argue that fiscal reforms that cause agents to expect lower future government deficits
may actually be expansionary by causing aggregate demand to increase as a consequence of
lower expected default and lower expected interest rates. This paper does not highlight the
importance of expectations of future government deficits. The approach focuses on the short
run effects of austerity policies and on the tradeoff between austerity and default.
t (o) argue that the threat of debt restructuring, which includes default, is overstated for
highly indebted Euro Zone economies. They argue that the cost of default would outweigh the
cost of austerity because of the effect reputation would have on future borrowing and spreads.
They also argue that it is not the primary balance that causes default, rather, the financing
cost of debt that is important in determining whether or not a country will default. They show
that although the marginal interest rate for highly indebted Euro Zone economies is high, the
average interest rate is low, making overall financing costs manageable2.
2The marginal interest rate is defined as the interest rate they would face if issuing new debt. The
average interest rate is the average of the rates they face on all their outstanding debt, of all maturities.
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This paper does not discount the probability of default and does not impose a preference for
either austerity or default as a way to deal with an unsustainable debt burden. Both policies
have associated costs and in each state the government evaluates those costs and makes the
optimal choice. This setup allows us to to examine what amount of austerity an economy
chooses to implement before it prefers to default.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the quan-
titative analysis. Section 4 contains comparative statics exercises. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Baseline Model
The analysis in this paper will be carried out using the model developed by a (u). The model
will be refereed to as the baseline hereafter.
The baseline is a representative agent model with households, a government, and foreign
creditors. Households are identical. They have an elastic labor supply, and government spending
is in their utility function. The government is benevolent and optimizes welfare for the household
by trading bonds with foreigners, spending on public goods, and taxing household consumption.
Foreign creditors are risk neutral. The model is outlined below:
2.2.1 Households
The representative household values government spending Gt. It chooses the time it allocates
to production lt and consumption Ct to maximize lifetime expected utility.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Gt, 1− lt) (2.1)
The per period utility function is well behaved, it is concave, strictly increasing, and twice
differentiable in all its variables.
U(Ct, Gt, 1− lt) = pi
(
G1−σ
1− σ
)
+ (1− pi)
(
(C − l1+ψ1+ψ )1−σ
1− σ
)
The households own the firms are perfectly competitive and use the following technology:
yt = AtF (lt) = Atlt (2.2)
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Where productivity, At, follows a log normal AR(1) process:
ln(At) = ρln(At−1) + εt
The government raises revenue by imposing distortionary taxes on household consumption.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility given government expenditures Gt and
the tax rate Tt subject to the following budget constraint:
(1 + Tt)Ct = AtF (lt) (2.3)
The first order condition from the household’s problem is:
Ul(Ct, Gt, 1− lt)
Uc(Ct, Gt, 1− lt) =
AtFl(lt)
(1 + Tt)
(2.4)
The optimal labor supply of households is:
l∗ =
(
At
1 + Tt
) 1
ψ
When the government increases taxes, households work less hours.
2.2.2 Government
The government is benevolent and maximizes the utility of households. It borrows and lends in
international markets, and funds its borrowing and public spending by raising distorting taxes
on consumption.
Financial markets are incomplete. Each period the government issues one-period non-state
contingent bonds Bt+1. Repayment is not enforceable, and the government may decide to
default at any time.
Each period, the government evaluates the value of repaying its debt, and the value of
defaulting. If the value of repayment is higher (lower) than the value of default, the government
decides to repay (default). The government solves the following problem: 3
V0(B,A) = max {V c(B,A), V d(A)} (2.5)
3Everything will be defined recursively hereafter. Variables with a ′ denote values in the next period.
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where V c(B,A) is the value of retaining access to credit markets, and V d(A) is the value of
defaulting.
When B′ has a negative face value, B′ ≤ 0, the government is borrowing money from
abroad. It receives −q(B,A)B′ this period, and repays B′ next period. q(B,A) is the price of
the bond.
When the government has access to credit markets, it chooses consumption and labor supply
for households using their budget constraint. It also chooses the tax rate, labor supply, and
bond purchases using the government budget constraint. Formally, the government solves the
following problem:
V c(B,A) = maxT,G,B′{U(C∗, G, 1− l∗) + β
∑
A′
V0(B
′, A′)Q(A′/A)} (2.6)
subject to
G = TC∗ +B − q(B′, A)B′ (2.7)
AF (l∗) = (1 + T )C∗
AFl(l
∗)
(1 + T )
=
Ul(C
∗, G, 1− l∗)
Uc(C∗, G, 1− l∗)
As shown in equation (7) the government uses its tax revenue, TC∗, and funds raised from
borrowing abroad, −q(B′, A)B′,to purchase public goods that are valued by households. This
signifies a sort of transfer made to households by the government.
When the government defaults, it is penalized in two ways:
1. It is shut out of financial markets temporarily. Re-entry is exogenous with a probability
of µ.
2. It suffers an exogenous productivity loss represented by h(A) where:
h(A) =

θE(A) ifA > θE(A)
A ifA ≤ θE(A)
When in default, the government solves the following optimization problem:
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V d(A) = maxTd,Gd{U(C∗d , Gd, 1− l∗d) + β
∑
A′
[µV0(0, A
′) + (1− µ)V d(A′)]Q(A′/A)} (2.8)
subject to
Gd = TdC
∗
d
h(A)F (l∗d) = (1 + Td)C
∗
d
h(A)Fl(l
∗
d)
(1 + Td)
=
Ul(C
∗
d , Gd, 1− l∗d)
Uc(C∗d , Gd, 1− l∗d)
Given a value for the productivity shock, A, define the set of debt holdings Γ(B) for which
default is the optimal choice as:
Γ(B) = {B ∈ Φ|V c(B,A) < V d(A)} (2.9)
Φ is the set of all debt B. It is a connected set, thus for any output shock A, if B ∈ Ψ and
Bˆ < B then Bˆ ∈ Ψ. This means that for a given productivity shock, once a certain level of
debt warrants default, all higher levels of debt will warrant default.
Given the government’s decision to repay its debt, define Ξ(A,B) as the set of the states of
the economy where the tax rate would have been lower had the government defaulted.
Ξ(B,A) = {B ∈ Φ, A ∈ Υ|T (B′, B,A) > Td(B′, B,A)} (2.10)
Ξ(A,B) determines the austerity region, which will be discussed in Section 3.
2.2.3 Foreign Lenders
Foreign lenders choose B′ to maximize profits pi.
pi(B′, A) =

qB′ − 11+rfB′, if B′ ≥ 0;
(1−δ(B′,A))
1+rf
(−B′)− q(−B′), if B′ < 0.
Where δ is the probability of default, and is defined as δ(B′, A) =
∑
A′∈Γ(B′)Q(A
′|A). rf
is the risk free interest rate. Γ(B) is the set of values for the productivity shock for which
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default is the optimal decision, given the debt level B. It is defined as Γ(B) = {B ∈ Φ|V c(B,
A) < V d(A)}. The probability of default is zero when the default set is empty, Γ(B′) = ∅ , and
one when the default set is the entire set of assets, Γ(B′) = Υ.
Since foreign lenders are risk neutral, pi(B′, A) = 0, and the price of bonds is:
q(B′, A) =

1
1+rf
, if B′ ≥ 0;
(1−δ(B′,A))
1+rf
, if B′ < 0.
2.2.4 Timing
1. Period t begins. The government has debt, B, from last period. The productivity shock,
A, is revealed.
2. Prices are determined.
3. The government either has access to credit markets or is in default.
(a) If the government is not in default, it decides whether or not to default. In order to do
this, it must evaluate welfare conditional on the decision to default, and conditional
on the decision to repay.
i. If the government repays:
A. It chooses the tax rate T . Households choose the labor supply l.
B. It chooses debt for the next period B′.
C. Private consumption C is determined from the household budget constraint.
Government expenditures G are determined from the government budget
constraint.
ii. If the government defaults:
A. It walks away from its outstanding debt B and is shut out of international
financial markets.
B. It chooses the tax rate T . Households choose the labor supply l.
C. Private consumption C is determined from the household budget constraint.
Government expenditures G are determined from the government budget
constraint.
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iii. If the welfare from i is greater (lower) than the welfare from ii the government
decides to repay (default).
(b) If the government is in default it solves V d(A) and regains access to markets for the
next period with probability θ. Welfare will be V c(0, A) if it regains access.
4. Period t+ 1 begins.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
First order conditions from the government’s problem
After simplification, the first order condition for the tax rate is:
Uc(C,G, 1− l) AF (l
∗)
(1 + T )2
= Ug(C,G, 1− l)
[
AF (l∗)
(1 + T )2
+
TAFl(l
∗)
(1 + T )
∂l
∂T
]
(2.11)
The Euler equation for the government is:
Ug(C,G, 1− l)
[
q +B′
∂q
∂B′
− TAFl(l∗)
(1 + T )
∂l
∂B′
]
= β
∑
A′∈∆(B)
Ug(C
′, G′, 1− l′)Q(A′|A) (2.12)
We are interested in examining the relative cost of increasing taxes to repay outstanding debt
when defaulting is a viable option. In order to examine this question, substitute Ug(C,G, 1− l)
from (10) into (11) and rearrange to get:
Uc(C,G, 1− l) AF (l
∗)
(1 + T )2
= β
∑
A′∈∆(B)
Ug(C
′, G′, 1− l′)Q(A′|A)
[
AF (l∗)
(1+T )2
+ TAFl(l
∗)
(1+T )
∂l
∂T
]
[
q +B′ ∂q∂B′ − TAFl(l∗)(1+T ) ∂l∂B′
] (2.13)
Suppose the government has a high level of outstanding debt and wants to increase taxes to
cover the debt burden. This is referred to as an austerity measure. The austerity measure will
affect the labor supply, private consumption, future holdings of debt, and public consumption.
If the taxes raised are used to cover outstanding debt B, the level of future borrow-
ing B′ will be low, as will the level of government expenditures today G. An increase in
taxes decreases consumption today by AF (l
∗)
(1+T )2
and increases future government expenditure by[
AF (l∗)
(1+T )2
+ TAFl(l
∗)
(1+T )
∂l
∂T
]
. The increase in taxes causes the labor supply to decrease, i.e. ∂l∂T < 0.
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Thus the magnitude of the increase in future government spending will depend on the elasticity
of labor supply with respect to taxes.
In an austerity scenario, there are two factors that affect the ability to repay outstanding
debt, and as a consequence, affect the amount of future debt the country needs to hold. First,
the decline in labor supply could cause tax revenues to go down. If the revenue raised is not
sufficient, the level of future borrowing might not be low enough to be considered sustainable.
Second, the price of bonds is decreasing in the level of debt ∂q∂B′ < 0. The higher the level of
debt, the higher the probability of default, and the lower the price of the bond q. This may
force the government to issue higher levels of debt in the future to roll over the unpaid portion
of outstanding debt. This causes B′ ∂q∂B′ to increase.
4
Thus, the country may not find immediate relief from its debt problems after its austerity
plan and could find itself in a “slippery slope” situation where the higher level of taxes only
increases the need to borrow more in the future to smooth consumption for households. The
extent of this will depend on the value of
[
q +B′ ∂q∂B′ − TAFl(l∗)(1+T ) ∂l∂B′
]
. As long as the government
has access to credit markets, it will smooth households’ utility by making public purchases in
bad times. When the next period occurs, the government can decide to default if given the
productivity shock the new outstanding debt level is higher than the threshold. The threshold
in turn depends on the state of the economy, it is increasing in the productivity shock A and
decreasing in the level of outstanding debt B.
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
2.3.1 Data and Calibration
a (u) calibrate their model to explain Mexican data from 1980 to 2007. The data are from Banco
de Mexico and are seasonally adjusted quarterly real series. Data for interest rate spreads are
from EMBI for 1994 to 2007. Table 2.1 shows the parameters used in a (u).
Table 2.2 shows a comparison of moments from the baseline model and the data. a (u) find
that their model matches the data well. Models of strategic default are generally not able to
generate debt to GDP ratios that match those of countries that default n (a). Even so, this
4High debt means that B′ will be large and negative. Since ∂q∂B′ < 0, B
′ ∂q
∂B′ will be larger the more
the country borrows.
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Table 2.1: Parameters for Mexico
Value Target statistics
Risk aversion σ 2 Consumption volatility 3%
Discount factor β 0.97 Standard RBC value
Labor elasticity 1ψ 2.22 n (e)
Probability of reentry µ 0.1 Length of exclusion (10 qtrs)
Default penalty φ 0.01 Debt service to GDP ratio 4.5%
Weight of G in utility pi 0.3 G to C ratio of 16%
Risk-free interest rate rf 0.01 US annual interest rate
Output shock ρ 0.85 Output data
σε 0.006
Table 2.2: Benchmark model results
Mexican data (1980-2007) Benchmark model
σ(GDP) 2.37 2.37
σ(C) 2.90 2.44
σ(Tax) 0.57 0.20
σ(TB/GDP) 2.04 0.22
ρ(GDP,C) 0.92 0.99
ρ(GDP,G) 0.55 0.97
ρ(GDP,Tax) -0.33 -0.35
ρ(GDP,Spread) -0.63 -0.29
ρ(GDP,TB/GDP) -0.72 -0.36
model remains a suitable framework to analyze the limits of austerity policies in dealing with
a debt sustainability burden when default is an option because taxes are distorting and default
occurs in equilibrium.
2.3.2 Default and Austerity
Here I will discuss the spaces defined in equations 9 and 10 in light of the quantitative results
of the model.
Each period, the government decides whether or not to default on its outstanding debt
burden. Because the government maximizes welfare, the decision it makes is the optimal one.
The costs and benefits of both default and austerity are taken into account in order to arrive
at the decision. These costs and benefits are:
• Default
– Cost: when a country is in default, it loses access to international credit markets
and consequently, the ability to smooth household consumption.
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– Benefit: the debt burden is eliminated. Upon regaining access to financial markets,
the government will have no outstanding debt.
• Austerity
– Cost: an increase in taxes causes the supply of labor to decrease. As a consequence,
output also declines.
– Benefit: if the debt burden is lowered, the country will be closer to a more sustain-
able debt level and can potentially avert default.5
Before beginning the discussion on how much austerity is implementable before default
becomes the better option for dealing with high debt, I calculate the welfare effect of using either
austerity or default as the only policy to deal with an unsustainable debt burden. I measure
welfare as the percent change in utility that would be required to equate welfare between two
scenarios.6 First, I measure the welfare effect of austerity, µaust, by eliminating the possibility of
default. An economy that does not default will use austerity as its primary tool for dealing with
debt sustainability issues, allowing me to measure the cost of only using austerity to combat an
unsustainable debt burden. Welfare here is the change in utility required to equate welfare in
the baseline economy to an economy with no default. I find that µaust = −0.065%. This means
that using austerity as the sole policy to combat an unsustainable debt burden decreases utility
in the baseline economy by -0.065%.
Similarly, in order to calculate the welfare effect of default, I eliminate the ability to im-
plement austerity policies by fixing the tax rate. An economy that does not impose austerity
will use default as its primary tool for dealing with debt sustainability issues, allowing me to
measure the cost of only using default to combat an unsustainable debt burden. The welfare
effect, µdefa, is the percent change in utility required to equate welfare from the baseline model
to the model with no austerity. I find that µdefa = −0.04%. This means that using default
as the sole policy to combat an unsustainable debt burden decreases utility in the baseline
economy by -0.04%.7
5There is no certainty the austerity measures will prevent default. There are two reasons for this.
The first is because the new debt level might be too high given the future state of the economy. The
second is that the price of bonds might be too low.
6Please see Appendix A for details on the calculation of the welfare effect.
7The welfare effects are small because I do not control the timing of policy. If austerity or default
52
The welfare effects of austerity and default suggest that an economy is better off using both
policy tools rather than only one of them when combating a debt sustainability crisis. The
analysis in this paper focuses on examining when austerity measures are no longer productive
in combating an unsustainable debt burden and default becomes the better alternative.
The Default Space
The shaded region in Figure 2.1 shows the states of the world where default is the optimal
choice; the space defined by Γ(B) in equation 9. The default decision depends on the state
variables: debt outstanding and the shock to productivity. Given a productivity shock, default
becomes the optimal choice at some threshold level of outstanding debt. For every level of debt
higher than the threshold level of debt, default is the optimal choice. This can be seen by noting
that in Figure 2.1, the default space does not have holes. Figure 2.2 plots the threshold level of
debt as a percent of GDP against shocks to productivity. The more favorable the productivity
shock, the higher the amount of debt the country can hold before default becomes the optimal
choice. For adverse shocks to productivity, default becomes the optimal choice at low levels of
debt.
Figure 2.3 shows the price of bonds, which is endogenous to the probability of default. To
understand prices more clearly, divide the space in Figure 2.3 into three regions. The first
region is composed of states where debt holdings are larger than the threshold level for that
state. In this region, default is the optimal choice and the price of debt is near zero. The second
region includes states with debt levels around the threshold level. This region includes both
states where defaulting is the optimal choice and where it is not. The price of bonds in this
second region is between the price at the risk free rate and the near-zero lower bound. Here,
the probability of default is non-zero. The third region is composed of states where the debt
level is so low, the probability of default is zero and the price of bonds is that at the risk free
rate. The correspondence between the default set and the prices of bonds stems from the fact
that the information creditors have on the probability of default of the country is identical to
the information that the country has in this model. Prices are formed based on future levels of
debt q(B′, A), the expected probability of default matters in their calculation.
occur far enough in the future, their effect on welfare will be heavily discounted and as a consequence
very small.
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The Austerity Space
The austerity space is defined by the set Ξ(B,A) in equation 10. It is composed of states where:
• Repayment is preferred to default.
• The tax rate under repayment is higher than that under default.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the difference in the tax rate between the repayment scenario and
the autarkic scenario in states where repayment is optimal. The states where this difference is
positive represent the austerity space, because the government prefers to raise the tax rate than
to default. The difference in the tax rate is increasing with the debt burden and the productivity
shock. The lower the debt burden, the less the adjustment. For adverse productivity shocks,
a larger increase in the tax rate is needed to keep the debt burden sustainable. The more
adverse the productivity shock, the less effective austerity measures are in averting a default.
This can be seen in Figure 2.4 by noting that at low levels of debt, the country defaults before
implementing austerity measures.
Figure 2.5 plots the level of austerity against the threshold level of debt. For a threshold
level of debt, the corresponding difference in tax rates is the amount of austerity that is still
preferred to default, needed to keep the economy on a sustainable debt path. In essence, Figure
5 represents the limits of austerity given a debt to GDP ratio. Any increase in the tax rate
beyond what is shown would make default preferable to austerity. The graph is increasing in
the debt to GDP ratio because at low levels of productivity the amount of debt that can be
sustained without default is low. Additionally, at low levels of productivity, the amount of
austerity an economy can implement to maintain the sustainability of debt is low, and default
quickly becomes preferred to austerity. For example, at threshold levels of debt below 4%,
austerity is never an optimal policy. The decline in labor supply and output that austerity
would cause would harm welfare more than a default. On the other hand, in better states of
productivity, the threshold level of debt is higher and an economy would find implementing
austerity measures to the tune of a 6% increase in the tax rate more optimal than default.
2.3.3 The cost of austerity relative to the cost of default
In order to understand the relative cost of austerity with respect to default, I examine the
tradeoffs associated with raising taxes and defaulting. In the baseline model presented above,
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the indebted government evaluates austerity and default within the Bellman equation in (12).
The outcome, whether to default or increase taxes, depends on assessing the costs and benefits
of default and austerity. In order to unpack the elements that go into this decision, I examine
the costs and benefits of default and austerity using the policy functions generated by the
model.
Revenue generated from austerity policies are used to repay part of this period’s outstanding
debt, which would decrease the amount of outstanding debt in the next period. Indeed, the
purpose of austerity measures is to decrease the debt burden for the future and decrease the
probability of default. The effectiveness of austerity policies in improving debt sustainability
depends on two things: tax revenues and the price of bonds. If the increase in taxes affects
the labor supply enough to decrease tax revenues, the amount of debt repayment will be low.
Additionally, the price of bonds is decreasing in the level of debt. Lower bond prices make
rolling over outstanding debt more costly. The ability to finance outstanding debt, either by
repayment or by rolling over the debt burden, is important because it determines future debt
holdings which in turn affect the probability of default. Deciding whether to implement further
austerity measures or to default depends not only on welfare today, but also on the expectation
of welfare in the future. This is where the importance of the future debt level appears. I will
discuss the relationship of future borrowing B′ with the productivity shock A, outstanding debt
B, and bond prices q(B′, A).8 This will frame the comparison between austerity policies and
default by detailing the chain of events that lead from an increase in the tax rate to a change
in future debt holdings.
It will be helpful for the discussion to reiterate the partition of the price of the bond into
three regions: the price at the risk free interest rate, the price in default (zero), and the price
in between those two extremes (the intermediate price).
Figure 2.6 plots, for a bad shock to productivity (-3%), the decision to borrow in the future
B′ against outstanding debt B expressed as a % of GDP. The red line represents cases where
the level of future borrowing is larger than the level of outstanding debt, the portion above
the 45 degree line. For low outstanding levels of debt to GDP ratios, the government chooses
debt to GDP ratios for the future that are higher than those today in order to smooth the
utility of households. At a certain debt to GDP ratio the government starts to cut back on its
8Since the price of bonds depends on the amount of future borrowing, we can not make causal
statements on the relationship between them.
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debt levels and borrow less in the future than the amount of outstanding debt today. I will
refer to this level of debt as the inflection point of debt. After the inflection point of debt,
the government implements austerity measures and cuts back on borrowing to maintain debt
sustainability. In Figure 2.6 the inflection point occurs when the outstanding debt level is 4.5%
of GDP. Figure 2.7 plots the price of bonds given the same shock to productivity in Figure 2.6.
Around the inflection point of debt, 4.5% of GDP, the price of the bond drops dramatically,
making rolling over debt very costly. In the same state that the government is implementing
austerity to decrees its debt burden, it also starts to face very high financing costs for its debt
burden. The probability of default is very high since efforts to bring the debt level back to a
sustainable level face an uphill battle.
At the steady state level of productivity, Figure 2.8 plots the future borrowing decision
against the outstanding debt to GDP ratio. The government starts to cut back on its debt
burden when the outstanding debt to GDP ratio is almost 6%. At that same debt to GDP
ratio, 6%, Figure 2.9 shows that the price of bonds is lower than the risk free price, but still
much greater than the price at default, which makes rolling over outstanding debt a reasonable
albeit costly way to maintain debt sustainability. At the steady state for the productivity shock,
the economy defaults after the debt to GDP ratio of 11% (Figure 2.8). But in the states where
the outstanding debt burden is between 6% and 11% the government is cutting back on its
debt burden using austerity measures. In those states the price of bonds is not very low and
the government can also roll over its debt burden, aiding the austerity efforts in maintaining
debt sustainability.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 are plotted given a good shock to productivity. Figure 2.10 shows that
the government cuts back on the outstanding debt burden when the outstanding debt to GDP
ratio is between 20% and 27%. During these states, the price of bonds is in the intermediate
region and quite high, making rolling over debt affordable. When productivity shocks are
favorable, austerity measures have a greater chance of being effective. The better the state of
productivity when the government decides to cut back on its borrowing, the higher the price
of bonds during states of cutting back debt, and the easier it is to finance the remaining debt
burden.
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2.4 Comparative Statics
I explore how changes in the parameters of the baseline model affect the threshold debt to GDP
ratio and the the cost of austerity relative to default.
2.4.1 Haircut
Default in the baseline model allows the government to walk away from its outstanding debt
obligations. Thus, upon re-entry to markets, a sovereign that has defaulted will have no out-
standing debt. In practice, default usually involves restructuring the country’s debt in some
way e (u) n (a). A country that defaults rarely imposes a 100% haircut on its creditors. Rather,
the sovereign makes repayments on terms different than the original. This could mean a change
in the coupon rate, maturity date, par value, or a combination of these.
In order to account for this reality, I impose a haircut that is less than 100% on creditors
after a default. As a consequence, when the sovereign regains access to credit markets, its
outstanding debt burden will be the debt level it defaulted on minus the haircut. u (r) find
that the average haircut creditors face after a default is 37% and this is the value that I use.
Introducing a haircut that is lower than 100% changes the incentive to default in a significant
way. When a sovereign must repay part of its outstanding debt burden after default, the cost
of default increases and default is the optimal choice in fewer states of the world. This can
be seen by noting that the shaded region in Figure 2.12 is smaller than that in Figure 2.1.
Since governments prefer to default in fewer states of the world, the debt to GDP threshold
for default is higher for all states of productivity. Figure 2.13 plots the threshold debt to GDP
ratio and the difference in tax rates between access and autarky.
The peculiar shape of the threshold debt to GDP ratio in Figure 2.13 is a result of the
dynamics of debt overhang and labor supply. At low productivity levels, households supply less
labor than they would in autarky and pay much lower taxes than they would in autarky (Figure
2.13). In these states of bad productivity shocks and debt levels just lower than the default
threshold, the government takes policy measures opposite to those in autarky. It smooths house-
hold utility by imposing less taxes and borrowing to its limit to make transfers to households
in the form of public spending.
The threshold debt to GDP ratio is also influenced by debt overhang that occurs after a
default. As noted earlier, the main benefit of default is to decrease the debt burden. In the
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baseline mode, when a government defaults it walks away from its outstanding debt burden. In
contrast, when an economy can not impose a 100% haircut, there will be a debt burden to repaid
even after default. An economy that defaults and gives creditors a haircut of 37% will have
to repay 63% of its outstanding debt burden while enduring a post default environment with
lower productivity and no access to international borrowing and lending. For these reasons,
the threshold level of debt in bad productivity shocks is around the threshold with the best
productivity shocks, about 33% (Figure 2.13). In contrast, the baseline economy defaults at
a low threshold debt to GDP ratio in bad states of the world, from 5% to 10% (Figure 2.2).
When there is a haircut, default is so costly that even an economy in a bad state of the world
would want to avoid it. In these bad states, the government borrows more and taxes households
less in order to smooth their utility.
2.4.2 Productivity Volatility
I examine how the specification of the productivity shock affects policy outcomes. In the
baseline model, productivity is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
ln(At) = ρln(At−1 + εt)
with E(ε) = 0 and E(ε2) = σ2ε where ρ = 0.85 and σε = 0.0058.
I change the process to exhibit more volatility and persistence, ρ = 0.945 and σε = 0.025.
With this specification for the productivity shocks, default occurs almost exclusively during bad
productivity shocks (Figure 2.14).9 There is a notable absence of default in the good states of
the world. The contrast between default in good and bad states is largely due to the increase in
persistence. In good states of the world the economy is likely to remain in good states, making
the probability of default zero and keeping the price of bonds at the risk free rate. High bond
prices make rolling over debt affordable. In bad states of the world, the opposite is true. Since
the probability of remaining in a bad state is so high, the probability of default is positive and
high, and the price of bonds is very low. Low bond prices make rolling over debt very costly,
thus default becomes the optimal policy for most bad states.
Since persistence is higher than in the baseline model, the value of consumption smoothing
is higher, and as a consequence the value of maintaining access to international credit markets
9This is the process for productivity in Argentina as noted in e (r)
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is high. This is reflected in the threshold debt to GDP levels and in the amount of austerity the
economy will tolerate. The threshold level of debt to GDP in Figure 2.15 is larger and steeper
than it is in the baseline (Figure 2.2). When the state of the economy shows any improvement,
the threshold debt to GDP ratio increases dramatically. Figure 2.15 shows that at a productivity
shock of -1% the threshold debt to GDP ratio is 7% and at the steady state level of productivity
it is 36%. Whereas in the baseline, a similar change in productivity pushes the threshold debt
to GDP ratio from 5% to 10%. Persistence causes the more drastic change in threshold because
when the state of the economy improves, the government uses the opportunity to maintain
access to credit markets in order to smooth consumption.
Persistence also makes the austerity measures more drastic than those in the baseline. Figure
2.15 shows that the difference between the tax rate with access to markets and in austerity at
the steady state level of productivity is 9% whereas it is 4% in the baseline (Figure 2.5). Given a
bad state of productivity, the economy with higher volatility and persistence in its output shock
will make larger adjustments to the fiscal balance before deciding to default. This is because
the value of maintaining access to international credit markets high when the probability of
remaining in bad states of the world is high.
2.4.3 Output Cost of Default
Once default becomes more costly, the government defaults in fewer states of the world. We
have seen how a lower haircut and higher persistence for the productivity shock add to the cost
of default. In this section, I impose a larger productivity loss for an economy after a default.
This causes the costliness of default to increase in the same proportion for every state of the
world resulting in much less default than the baseline and all other cases. Figure 2.16 shows
the results for an economy that loses 4% of productivity after a default (φ = 0.04). When the
cost of default is loosing 4% of productivity, the government only defaults in the worst states:
those with the lowest productivity and the highest outstanding debt. As a consequence to the
government’s aversion to default, the threshold debt to GDP ratio in Figure 2.17 is much higher
than that in the baseline.
Figure 2.17 also shows that there is very low tolerance for austerity policies as a tool to
alleviate the debt burden. The largest increase in the tax rate occurs at a shock of -2% to
productivity, here the government raises the tax rate by 2.5% to deal with the debt burden. As
we have seen, the tolerance for austerity is lowest for the most adverse shocks to productivity.
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This is because in bad states, the price of bonds deteriorates quickly, making rolling over the
debt burden very costly. Since default only occurs in the worst productivity states, and we are
interested in the amount of austerity that is implemented before a default becomes the optimal
choice, the austerity space that we are examining is also in the worst productivity states.
2.5 Conclusion
Using the quantitative dynamic stochastic open economy model developed by a (u), this paper
examines when austerity measures are no longer productive in combating an unsustainable debt
burden and default becomes the better alternative. The model in a (u) is suitable for evaluating
the limit of the usefulness of austerity measures because it includes two main features: the option
to default and distorting taxes.
I find that in the baseline model, in the face of an unsustainable debt burden, the amount of
austerity an economy can implement before a default becomes the preferable policy is increasing
in the threshold debt to GDP ratio. When the threshold debt level is 5% of GDP, the economy
can tolerate almost no austerity. When the threshold is 15%, the economy can increase the tax
rate by 4% before default becomes the better alternative. This positive correlation between the
threshold and the limits of austerity stems from the state of the economy. When the state of
the economy is bad, the threshold is low and the tolerance for austerity is low.
As we have seen, the specifics of the tradeoff between austerity and default vary depending
on the parametrization of the model. But one thing remains common, the worse the state of
productivity shocks, the less willing the government is to implement austerity measures. As for
the willingness to default, it depends on how the cost of default is modeled. The more costly
the default, the less willing a country is to default and the higher the threshold debt to GDP
levels.
The price function for bonds has important implications for the preference of austerity over
default as a way to deal with debt sustainability issues. When the price of bonds is a steep
function of the state of productivity, the tolerance for austerity is very low and the ability to
roll over the debt burden is limited because of the high financing cost. This is reminiscent of
the Greek scenario. The difference is that the outstanding debt burden Greece has is very large.
The model here can not replicate a debt burden as high as 170% of GDP because bonds are
one period, and the government is a rational welfare maximizing agent. Alternatively, if the
price of bonds is a constant function of the state of the economy and always valued at the risk
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free rate, as is the current case in the United States, the government would be able to roll over
its debt burden without having to resort to severe austerity measures.
In the model presented in this paper, the welfare cost of each of austerity and default is
small and very close. Because of this, other factors may be important in determining the extent
to which austerity measures will be chosen over default when dealing with a debt sustainability
crisis. This may depend on a host of political economy factors. For example, the ideology of
the government would play an important role in determining how much austerity to employ. If
default is not considered an option for dealing with a debt sustainability crisis, the government
will use only austerity, and vice versa. Political economy factors do not play a role in the paper
presented here, but incorporating them into the framework is an interesting avenue for future
research.
Going forward it will be important to evaluate when austerity measures are no longer pro-
ductive in combating an unsustainable debt burden and default becomes the better alternative
using empirical estimates for the the cost of default and the cost of austerity. It will also be
interesting to incorporate monetary policy into the theoretical framework. In this way, it will
be possible to discuss both monetary and fiscal policies aimed at restoring debt sustainability.
I leave these topics for future research.
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Figure 2.1: Default Space
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Figure 2.2: Default Threshold
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Figure 2.3: Bond Prices
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Figure 2.4: Austerity Space
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Figure 2.5: Austerity Threshold
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Figure 2.6: Future Borrowing – Bad Productivity Shock
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Figure 2.7: Bond Price – Bad Productivity Shock
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Figure 2.8: Future Borrowing – Steady State Productivity
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Figure 2.9: Bond Price – Steady State Productivity
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Figure 2.10: Future Borrowing – Good Productivity Shock
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Figure 2.11: Bond Price – Good Productivity Shock
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Figure 2.12: Haircut – Default Space
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Figure 2.13: Haircut – Threshold Debt and Austerity
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Figure 2.14: Volatility and Persistence – Default Space
−0.25 −0.2 −0.15 −0.1 −0.05 0
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
Outstanding Debt
O
ut
pu
t S
ho
ck
75
Figure 2.15: Volatility and Persistence – Threshold Debt and Austerity
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Figure 2.16: Output Cost – Default Space
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Figure 2.17: Output Cost – Threshold Debt and Austerity
0.97 0.98 0.99 1 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04
32
33
34
35
36
37
O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 D
eb
t a
s 
%
 o
f G
DP
Productivity Shock
 
 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 T
ax
 R
at
e
Debt
Tax
78
Chapter 3
Does Capital Scarcity Matter?
3.1 Introduction
The neo-classical model predicts that capital account liberalization will increase allocative ef-
ficiency by allowing capital to flow from countries where it is abundant to countries where it
is scarce. The incipient flow of capital into liberalizing economies lowers their cost of capital,
increases investment and economic growth leading to a permanent increase in the standard of
living s (i,i); s (b); g (o); m (u); n (e).
Research on the macroeconomic impact of capital account liberalization finds few, if any,
robust effects of liberalization on real variables (i.e. investment and GDP per capita). n (e)
argues that we should not regard the prevailing null effect findings as conclusive because most
papers employ cross-sectional regressions designed to measure long-run permanent differences
in growth rates in economic variables of interest (See surveys by i (d) and s (o) and the studies
therein). In contrast to tests for permanent effects, the textbook theory of liberalization calls
for a temporary impact on growth rather than a permanent one n (e). Therefore, cross-sectional
regressions that do not find permanent growth effects of liberalization do not undermine the
predictions of the neo-classical model.
This paper quantifies the welfare impact of a permanently higher level of income per capita
brought about by temporarily higher growth in the aftermath of capital account liberalization. If
agents are infinitely-lived, the increase in consumption (welfare) brought about by liberalization
may not be quantitatively important over the infinite lifetime consumption path u (o). However,
if the lion’s share of the welfare benefits from liberalization accrues over relatively short horizons,
and in the early years after policy implementation, then calculating the welfare benefits over a
finite horizon may be more appropriate, and policy-relevant.
We use the technical apparatus in u (o) to measure the welfare effects of closing the capital
gap in moving from financial autarky to financial integration. Agents live in an infinite-horizon
Ramsey world where under autarky, the economy has an endogenous consumption path that
depends on the rate of time preference. We assume that the autarkic economy will converge to
a world steady state where the capital to effective ratio is given by an exogenously given world
interest rate. This assumption allows us to fix the size of the capital gap between the capital
to effective labor ratio in autarky and the capital to effective labor ratio implied by the world
interest rate under integration. This setup assumes that an economy instantaneously converges
to its steady state when it opens up. We make this assumption to abstract from speed of
convergence issues. The model apparatus is then used to quantify the Hicksian consumption
equivalent welfare gain from moving to financial integration from autarky.
In the neo-classical framework the increase in growth following capital account liberalization
is a transitory phenomenon driven by a windfall accumulation of capital. The neo-classical
model predicts that capital account liberalizations lead to a permanent increase in the level of
the capital stock. The decline in the interest rate brought about by capital account liberalization
leads the economy to transition to its steady state level of capital immediately. Along the
transition path, capital grows temporarily at a higher rate. Once the economy reaches its
steady state implied by the world interest rate, the level of the capital stock is permanently
higher. The temporary increase in the growth rate of capital thus leads to a permanent increase
in the level of the capital stock.
Once the capital-output ratio adjusts from its initial level to the level predicted by an
integrated equilibrium, the steady state growth rate in the liberalizing economy returns to its
growth rate in autarky. Therefore while capital account liberalization leads to a permanent
increase in the level of per capita output, the growth effect is only transitory.
The temporary growth effect prediction of the neo-classical model suggests examining tran-
sition dynamics to judge the value of liberalization more accurately. In looking at transitional
short-term effects an obvious question is whether these effects are economically meaningful.
In other words, how do we quantify the welfare gains from capital account liberalization? By
recognizing that theory only predicts a temporary growth effect from liberalization, we can
identify the timing of the increase in growth and measure its impact on welfare.
Computationally, the point is a simple one. If the increase in growth is temporary and
occurs in the early years following the policy change, measuring the percent increase in annual
consumption relative to the infinite horizon consumption stream results in the welfare gains
80
from capital account liberalization being very small. However, when the percent increase in
annual consumption is viewed in relation to a shorter finite horizon consumption stream, the
welfare effects of liberalization are quite considerable. The reason is that a very large fraction
of the benefits of opening up happen in the early years.
To quantify the temporary growth effect, we begin by asking, what is the capital to effective
labor ratio implied by an exogenously given world interest rate? The answer to this question
determines how much the autarkic capital to effective labor ratio will change for an exogenously
given world interest rate when a country opens up. We use the change in the capital to effective
labor ratio to evaluate the welfare implications of capital account liberalization. The welfare
effects of moving from autarky to an open capital account depend of the size of the capital gap,
i.e., the difference between the capital to effective labor ratio in autarky and under financial
integration. The degree of capital scarcity in autarky is used to evaluate the welfare benefits
of capital account liberalization across different horizons. We find that 95% of the increase in
annual consumption from capital account liberalization accrues in the first 10-15 years after the
opening.
The finite horizon methodology for measuring welfare gains tells us the amount of compen-
sation people would require to make them indifferent between implementing liberalization or
not. For example, in the first ten years, what is the percent change in autarkic consumption
that agents would need to be compensated in order to not implement the policy? Our estimates
show that in the first few years, people require large amounts of compensation in order to make
them indifferent between implementing the policy change or not. The large initial impact of
the policy change drives this finding.
Evaluating welfare gains from liberalizations under an infinite time horizon underestimates
the gains enjoyed in the decades immediately following liberalization. This is because differences
in the consumption paths of autarky and integration are largest soon after liberalization, yet
they comprise a small portion of welfare gains when calculated using the infinite stream of
consumption.
It is important to note that permanent growth effects are caused by an increase in TFP
changes and in the context of the neo-classical growth model, TFP changes are independent of
the capital account regime. Since cross sectional regressions test whether liberalizations lead to
a permanent growth effect, it is not surprising that they do not find a significant relationship.
We implement a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of our results. First,
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we examine the assumption made about the nature of the evolution of the interest rate across
time in the autarkic economy versus the integrated economy. The u (o) framework calls for
absolute convergence to a world steady state pinned down by the world interest rate, we perform
an additional computation assuming conditional convergence. We use stock market data to use
country-specific earnings price ratios as a measure of the capitalization rate.
Second, we account for the financing cost of capital inflows. The magnitude of the welfare
gain from liberalization is affected by the cost associated with liberalizing the capital account.
Capital that flows into a newly liberalized economy is not costless. If this capital is in the
form of debt, interest repayments must be made in the future. This will impact domestic
consumption under integration and thus, welfare. Like u (o), in the baseline model we assume
that the infinitely-lived economy services the capital it borrows from the rest of the world
to finance its instantaneous convergence to the world steady state as interest payments in
perpetuity. Here, the principal is never paid off. In order to quantify the net benefits of capital
account liberalization we examine alternative financial contracts. We examine the baseline
and alternative debt contracts of varying horizons to quantify the costs of capital account
liberalization and their impact on finite horizon welfare gains in liberalizing economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief sketch of an infinite-horizon
Ramsey model. Section 3 quantifies the Hicksian consumption equivalent welfare gains from
capital account liberalization in the infinite and finite horizons. Section 4 presents robustness
checks and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 An Infinite-Horizon Ramsey Model: The Gourinchas-Jeanne (2006) For-
mulation
u (o), or GJ, use an infinite-horizon Ramsey model to examine the gains from a shift from
financial autarky to openness to international capital flows. Production is Cobb-Douglas. Raw
labor grows at the population growth rate n. Labor-augmenting technical change grows in-
creases the ratio of effective labor to raw labor at a rate of g. The rate of pure time preference
is ρ . The discount factor is thus β = 11+ρ . The rate of capital depreciation is δ.
GJ calculate the welfare benefits of capital account liberalization in terms of a Hicksian
equivalent variation defined as the percentage increase in consumption an autarkic economy
would enjoy as a result of liberalization. The domestic autarkic interest rate is assumed to
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converge to the world interest rate and the autarkic economy eventually reaches the same
steady state level of capital as the liberalized economy. Capital account liberalization in this
framework, therefore, serves to expedite a country’s convergence to its own steady state.
GJ’s findings suggest that in Hicksian consumption equivalent terms the welfare gains from
capital account liberalization are quite small. For example, a liberalization that more than
doubles the capital stock of an economy leads only to a population weighted average 1.74% per-
manent increase in annual consumption.1 To understand why GJ find such small welfare gains,
we begin by outlining their model. Consumers maximize the infinite sum of their discounted
utility from consumption as follows:
Ut =
∞∑
s=0
βsN(t+ s)u(ct+s) (3.1)
subject to:
c˜t + ngk˜t+1 = f(k˜t) + (1− δ)k˜t (3.2)
Using f(k˜αt ) = k˜
α
t and u(c) =
c1−γ
1−γ , the first order conditions are:
Rt = αk˜
α−1
t + 1− δ (3.3)
c˜t = (βRt+1)
−1
γ gc˜t+1 (3.4)
β, n and c are the discount factor, population, and per-capita consumption, respectively. At
the steady state, the world interest rate is equal to: R∗ = g
γ
β . Additionally, GJ assume that
the domestic interest rate converges to a long run interest rate R∗, which is the same as the
world interest rate by assumption.
lim
t→∞Rt = R
∗ = R∗w (3.5)
The assumption made in (5) has significant implications for the impact of capital account
liberalization. Consider two economies, one in autarky and the other that liberalizes. Assume
1This welfare gain is dwarfed compared to policy changes that affect domestic factor productivity.
In order to illustrate this point, GJ present a model with human capital accumulation in a ”Macro-
Mincer” framework and introduce distortions to the process of physical and human capital accumulation.
Policies that improve the quality of education or remove distortions from the economy are found to have
a profoundly greater welfare benefit than policies that liberalize the capital account.
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that both economies have the same initial capital stock, k˜0. The capital stock in the autarkic
economy evolves according to (2), (3), and (4) until it eventually reaches its steady state k˜∗.
At this steady state, the interest rate is equal to its long run value R∗ which according to (5)
is also equal to the world interest rate R∗w. Because of this, the steady state of the autarkic
economy is the same as the steady state of the rest of the world. Consumption in the autarkic
economy endogenously reaches c˜∗w.
A financially integrated economy faces the world interest rate, R∗w, directly upon liberaliza-
tion. Capital flows into the liberalizing economy and the steady state k˜∗w is reached instantly.
Since the steady state level of capital is identical to that of the autarkic economy, capital ac-
count liberalization serves to expedite an economy’s movement towards its own (world) steady
state. Figure 3.1 shows the consumption path of an economy in autarky and integration as-
suming that the capital inflow upon liberalization was costless. Of course, capital that flows
into a newly liberalized economy is not costless.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) assume that the infinitely-lived economy services the capital
it borrows from the rest of the world to finance its instantaneous convergence to the world steady
state as interest payments in perpetuity. Therefore steady state consumption under integration
is reduced by these payments every period. Figure 3.2 presents a graphical representation of
the results. Note that the consumption stream under integration is lower than in Figure 3.1
because of the financing costs associated with financial liberalization.
3.3 Are Transitional Growth Effects Economically Meaningful?
In looking at transitional short-term effects an obvious question is of course whether these
effects are economically meaningful. In other words, what is the magnitude of the welfare gains
from capital account liberalization?
3.3.1 The Magnitude of Welfare Gains in the Infinite Horizon
GJ report the gains from liberalization in terms of a Hicksian equivalent variation, µ, which
is the percentage increase in consumption it would take to equate the welfare of the autar-
kic economy to that of the liberalized economy. Welfare is calculated as the lifetime utility
from the optimal consumption path, Ut =
∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜t). Hence, welfare in the au-
tarkic economy and integrated economy is calculated as Uaut =
∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜autt ) and
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Uint =
∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜intt ), respectively. Thus, calculating µ involves equating the follow-
ing: ∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt (1 + µ)) =
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt )
This leads to the following expression for mu:
µ = exp[(1− βn)(Uint − Uaut)]− 1 (3.6)
Which is derived in the following manner :
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt (1 + µ)) =
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt )
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt ) + log(1 + µ)
∞∑
t=0
(βn)t =
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt )
log(1 + µ)
∞∑
t=0
(βn)t =
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt )−
∞∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt )
log(1 + µ) =
∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜intt )−
∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜autt )∑∞
t=0(βn)
t
µ = exp
(∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜intt )−
∑∞
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜autt )∑∞
t=0(βn)
t
)
− 1
µ = exp[(1− βn)(Uint − Uaut)]− 1
Since ∞∑
t=0
(βn)t = 1/(1− βn)
Using the parameters in Table 3.1, GJ report average population weighted µ equal to 1.74%.
The average initial population weighted capital-output ratio2 is 1.4 for the 82 non-OECD coun-
tries in their sample.
Following GJ’s interpretation of capital account liberalization, and using their parameter
values, we calibrate the consumption paths of the autarkic and integrated economies in order
to calculate µ. Since it is assumed that the initial capital-output ratio is 1.4, the autarkic
2This is the population-weighted average capital-output ratio equal to 140 for 82 non-OECD countries
in the Penn World Tables in 1995.
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Table 3.1: Parameters
Discount factor β 0.96
Capital share in production α 0.3
Depreciation rate δ 0.06
Output growth rate g 0.012
Population growth rate n 0.0074
economy will climb from the resulting initial level of capital, 1.62, to the steady state level of
capital, 3.97. We compute the optimal consumption path by Euler equation iteration in the
de-trended version of the representative agent problem . With that in hand it’s a simple matter
to plug-in the initial capital stock and iteratively solve for the consumption path in autarky
and integration.
In the case of capital account liberalization, the economy is assumed to enjoy the world
interest rate R∗w from the onset, it is thus at steady state from the initial period onward. This
also means that consumption is at its steady state level, minus interest repayment, from the
initial period onward. The population weighted average value of µ that GJ get as a result of
these calculations for the 82 non-OECD countries in their sample is 1.74%. This means that
in a neoclassical economy with no frictions, capital scarcity keeps consumption in the autarkic
economy from being, on average, 1.74% higher forever.
3.3.2 The Magnitude of Welfare Gains in the Finite Horizon
The measure for welfare gain, µ, as calculated in (6), finds the permanent percent increase
in autarkic consumption that would equate welfare in the autarkic economy to welfare in the
integrated economy in the infinite horizon. In other words, if the autarkic economy liberalized
its capital account, it will enjoy µ percent more consumption every period, forever. Intuitively,
calculating µ involves measuring the welfare from the infinite streams of integrated and au-
tarkic consumption, Uint and Uaut respectively, and backing out the percentage by which each
observation in the infinite autarkic consumption stream must increase in order to equate the
welfare in autarky to the welfare under integration.
From the formulation of capital account liberalization presented above, we know that
the difference between the autarkic and integrated consumption streams come from the pre-
convergence segment of the two streams. In the GJ formulation, after the autarkic economy
converges to the steady state, its consumption stream is the same as that of the integrated
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economy less interest payments.
The same welfare measure calculated using the infinite streams of consumption is used to
calculate the percentage increase in autarkic consumption resulting from liberalization in the
finite horizon. Since the majority of the difference in the autarkic and integrated consumption
streams occurs before convergence, the difference between welfare calculated using the infinite
streams of consumption comes about because of that small, finite, pre-convergence portion of
the infinite streams of consumption.
In the infinite horizon setup, the difference in welfare arising from these finite segments is
used to calculate the percentage increase, µ, for the entire stream of autarkic consumption over
the infinite horizon. In other words, the percentage increase for an infinite stream is calculated
using the welfare difference coming from a finite segment of the infinite stream. In addition,
the farther out consumption is in the future, the more it is discounted. Appendix C presents
an alternative way to evaluate the gains in consumption that are largely accumulated in the
short run.
In order to address the horizon issue, we can calculate the percentage by which autarkic
consumption must increase in a finite time period following liberalization in order to equate
autarkic and integrated welfare over that same finite time period. Let welfare be measured up
to time T where t ≤ T and denote the percentage change in consumption by µT 3. We know
that µT is calculated such that welfare in autarky and integration over that finite time period
are equivalent in a Hicksian sense. Thus:
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt (1 + µT )) =
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt )
This leads to the following expression for µT :
µT = exp
(
1− βn
1− (βn)T+1 (Uint − Uaut)
)
− 1 (3.7)
which is derived as follows:
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt (1 + µ)) =
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt )
3The argument holds for t∗ ≥ T as well. Explaining the intuition behind µT is more involved when
t∗ ≤ T , which is why that is the case presented above.
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T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt ) + log(1 + µ)
T∑
t=0
(βn)t =
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt )
log(1 + µ)
T∑
t=0
(βn)t =
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜intt )−
T∑
t=0
(βn)tlog(gtc˜autt )
log(1 + µ) =
∑T
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜intt )−
∑T
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜autt )∑T
t=0(βn)
t
µ = exp
(∑T
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜intt )−
∑T
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜autt )∑T
t=0(βn)
t
)
− 1
µT = exp
(
1− βn
1− (βn)T+1 (Uint − Uaut)
)
− 1
Since
T∑
t=0
(βn)t =
1− (βn)T+1
1− βn
Notice that in equation (7),(Uint − Uaut) =
∑t∗
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜intt ) −
∑t∗
t=0(βn)
tlog(gtc˜autt )
just as in (6). This is because the only gain in welfare occurs before convergence; autarkic and
integrated consumption streams from t∗ to T are equal. Yet, there is a difference in the way
this gain in welfare is weighed and this is reflected by the inverse of the finite geometric sum of
the discount factor multiplied by the population growth rate, 1−βn
1−(βn)T+1 . Since βn < 1 we know
that (1−βn) < 1−βn
1−(βn)T+1 ; therefore, µ < µT . Intuitively, this result makes sense because we are
trying to translate the welfare gain (Uint−Uaut), which is identical in both the infinite horizon
and the finite horizon ending at T , into a percentage increase in autarkic consumption for a
finite stream of consumption, µT , rather than a percentage increase in autarkic consumption
for an infinite stream of consumption, µ. Table 3.2 illustrates this point for a sample of 82
non-OECD countries.
This alternative measure of the increase in welfare, µT , takes into account the timing of the
gains from liberalization and would be better suited to evaluate certain liberalization policies.
Take the GJ (2006) formulation for liberalization for example. We know that the lion’s share
of the gain in welfare from liberalization occurs in the short run. Thus, in evaluating the
benefit from liberalization, we would like to know what the percentage increase in autarkic
consumption would be for the observations before convergence. A quick comparison to µ shows
that it underestimates the short run benefits of liberalization.
For the sample of 82 non-OECD countries, the infinite horizon average µ is a mere 1.47%
88
Table 3.2: Welfare Gains Over Finite Horizons
Average Quartiles
First Second Third Fourth
Sample Average k0 1.81 0.65 1.20 1.88 3.35
Time Horizon (Years) µT
5 32.03 59.59 38.21 24.64 8.07
10 22.85 41.59 27.65 18.11 5.74
15 16.92 30.47 20.58 13.59 4.30
20 13.11 23.52 15.97 10.57 3.36
25 10.55 18.93 12.84 8.50 2.72
30 8.75 15.73 10.63 7.02 2.26
35 7.43 13.41 9.02 5.93 1.92
40 6.44 10.67 7.80 5.10 1.67
45 5.67 10.32 6.85 4.45 1.47
50 5.06 9.26 6.10 3.94 1.31
∞ 1.47 3.08 1.68 0.90 0.36
Notes - µT reported in percentage points. Data are for 82 non-OECD countries. We use the capital
stock in 1995 for the initial level of capital. The sample is also divided into quartiles based on the size
of the capital stock in 1995.
increase in annual consumption. In contrast, the five year finite horizon µT is an order of
magnitude higher at 32.03%. As the finite horizon increases, consistent with theory µ declines
as the autarkic consumption path converges to its steady state value closing the gap between
the instantaneous increase in consumption afforded by integration.
Table 3.2 also shows that the magnitude of the finite horizon increase in welfare represented
by µT is directly proportional to the size of the capital gap between autarky and integration.
Appendix A lists countries by initial capital stock values by quartile. For the highly capital-
scarce countries in the first quartile of initial capital stock values k0, the finite horizon µT at five
years is a 59.59% increase in annual consumption. For non-OECD countries that are relatively
more capital-abundant, the five year finite horizon µT is a more modest increase in annual
consumption of 8.07% for countries in the fourth quartile of initial capital stock values.
The short run representation of the welfare gain captures the increase in welfare due to
the timing of the increase in consumption. Under the assumption that the newly integrated
economy will instantaneously enjoy the steady state consumption level, less interest payment,
the finite horizon calculation of µ measures this instant increase upon liberalization. It is clear
that the shorter the horizon, the larger the measure of the welfare gain from liberalization.
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Table 3.3: Welfare Gains Using EP Ratio
First Second Third Fourth
E
P − r∗ -0.018 -0.005 0.010 0.037
Time Horizon (Years) µT
5 20.31 14.99 15.59 5.89
10 15.57 10.86 10.63 3.83
15 12.24 8.12 7.43 2.73
20 9.97 6.31 5.38 2.11
25 8.38 5.07 4.00 1.71
30 7.23 4.19 3.03 1.45
35 6.38 3.54 2.33 1.26
40 5.73 3.04 1.79 1.12
45 5.22 2.66 1.38 1.01
50 4.81 2.35 1.05 0.93
∞ 2.39 0.54 -0.88 0.45
Notes - µT reported in percentage points. Data on
P
E ratios are from the Emerging Markets Data Base.
The sample is also divided into quartiles based on the size of the premium R∗i − R∗. Details on the
countries is included in Appendix B.
3.4 Robustness Checks
3.4.1 Conditional Convergence.
We examine the assumption made about the nature of the evolution of the interest rate across
time in the autarkic economy versus the integrated economy. The u (o) framework calls for
absolute convergence to a world steady state pinned down by the world interest rate. Here
we consider conditional convergence, meaning that countries’ interest rates may not necessarily
converge to a common world interest rate. We use stock market data to use country-specific
earnings price ratios as a measure of the capitalization rate. Table 3.3 shows the results.
Assuming conditional convergence allows for cross country heterogeneity, in educational
attainment, fertility decisions, technology, and institutions, that would make the steady state
levels of capital of countries differ r (a). Here, upon liberalization, instead of a country moving
to a steady state which is the same as the world steady state, it moves to its own unique
steady state. Recall that the steady state capital is determined by k∗i =
(
α
R∗i−δ−1
)( 1
1−α )
. Under
conditional convergence, the country specific interest rate R∗i determines a country specific
steady state level of capital. When a country’s interest rate R∗i is lower than the world interest
rate R∗, the steady state level of capital for that country is higher than the world steady
state level of capital. This means that the welfare effect of liberalization under conditional
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convergence will be higher than under absolute convergence. Liberalization here means that
the economy converges faster to a higher steady state. The opposite is true for an economy
where the interest rate is lower than the world interest rate.
The premium in Table 3.3 is R∗i −R∗. With the calibration in Table 3.1, the world interest
rate, R∗, is approximately 5.42%. When the premium is negative, the steady state level of
capital that the country is converging to is higher than the world steady state level of capital.
Liberalization will allow these countries to reach that higher steady state of capital faster. The
opposite is true when the premium is positive: the country’s steady state level of capital is lower
than the world steady state level of capital. Upon liberalization this country will converge to a
lower steady state and it will experience lower welfare than under the assumption of absolute
convergence.
3.4.2 Alternate Financial Contracts.
We also account for the financing cost of capital inflows. Capital that flows into a newly
liberalized economy is not costless. The magnitude of the welfare gain from liberalization is
affected by the cost associated with liberalizing the capital account. In order to quantify the
net benefits of capital account liberalization we examine alternative financial contracts. u (o)
assume that the infinitely-lived economy services the capital it borrows from the rest of the
world to finance its instantaneous convergence to the world steady state as interest payments
in perpetuity. Here, the principal is never paid off. We examine alternative debt contracts to
quantify the costs of capital account liberalization and their impact on finite horizon welfare
gains in liberalizing economies.
Infinite horizon model in Obstfeld-Rogoff (1996). In an infinite horizon problem, the
transversality condition implies that:
lim
T→∞
(
1
β
)T
Bt+T+1 = 0
This means that after substituting for Bt in the per period budget constraint and solving
for steady state consumption we get RBt = Ct + It − Yt +Bt+1 and steady state consumption
is given by:
C =
R− 1
R
(
RBt + lim
T→∞
(
1
β
)t
(Y − I)
)
91
Table 3.4: Welfare Gains: Obstfeld-Rogoff
Average Quartiles
First Second Third Fourth
Sample Average k0 1.81 0.65 1.20 1.88 3.35
Time Horizon (Years) µT
5 37.34 68.89 44.83 29.13 9.32
10 27.70 49.82 33.77 22.36 6.94
15 21.48 38.04 26.35 17.67 5.47
20 17.49 30.69 21.52 14.54 4.51
25 14.80 25.82 18.24 12.39 3.85
30 12.91 22.44 15.93 10.86 3.38
35 11.53 19.98 14.23 9.72 3.03
40 10.49 18.14 12.95 8.87 2.77
45 9.68 16.72 11.96 8.20 2.56
50 9.04 15.60 11.17 7.67 2.40
∞ 5.28 9.05 6.54 4.52 1.42
Notes - µT reported in percentage points. Data are for 82 non-OECD countries. We use the capital
stock in 1995 for the initial level of capital. The sample is also divided into quartiles based on the size
of the capital stock in 1995.
We return to a benchmark economy with an autarkic capital-output ratio of 1.44 and impose the
transversality condition which holds if and only if the economy in the infinite horizon has neither
unpaid debts nor unused resources to compute the welfare gains across different horizons. Here,
both the principal and interest are paid off at infinity. The welfare estimates are presented in
Table 3.4.
The economy in the infinite horizon has neither unpaid debts nor unused resources. If the
repayment occurs far enough into the future, it will not affect welfare in a drastic way because
of the discount factor. Comparing Table 3.4 to Table 3.3, we can see that the welfare gains
here are larger. Unlike the case with making repayments in perpetuity, here, the government
may schedule repayments to begin farther into the future. Using this mode for repayment
we only care about the resolution of debt by infinity, without specifying the way repayments
are distributed in the interim. The next section focuses on the way repayments are allocated
through time.
50 year debt contract. Consider an alternative debt contract with a finite, 50 year
repayment horizon where once again both principal and interest are paid off. If external debt
is amortized in equal payments over 50 years, then annual amortization will be Principal0T ,
4Note that this is the average population weighted autarky-level capital output ratio in GJ.
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Table 3.5: Welfare Gains: 50 Year Debt Contract
Quartiles
First Second Third Fourth
Time Horizon (Years) µT
5 34.82 18.90 7.75 -1.12
10 19.59 10.49 4.06 -0.59
15 10.92 5.24 1.64 -0.19
20 5.82 2.04 0.12 0.08
25 2.68 0.03 -0.85 0.26
30 0.68 -1.24 -1.47 0.38
35 -0.61 -2.05 -1.85 0.46
40 -1.43 -2.56 -2.08 0.50
45 -1.95 -2.85 -2.21 0.53
50 -2.25 -3.00 -2.26 0.54
∞ -0.98 -1.45 -1.06 0.42
Notes - µT reported in percentage points. Data are for 82 non-OECD countries. We use the capital
stock in 1995 for the initial level of capital. The sample is also divided into quartiles based on the size
of the capital stock in 1995.
and the corresponding amount of debt outstanding at the end of year t will be Pricipalt =
Principal0(1− t/T ), for t < 50 and zero thereafter. In addition to principal, the country must
pay interest on the amount of its external debt outstanding, in the amount zr∗Principalt,
where R∗ is the world interest rate. The results are presented in Table 3.5.
Consider the results in Table 3.5. Though µ at the infinite horizon is negative, the short
run calculations for µ are positive and large and slowly become negative for all quartiles except
the fourth. This effect depends on the size of the initial capital inflow. Consider the fourth
quartile, where the initial level of capital is the highest. Since the initial level of capital is
close to the steady state level, in the short run, upon liberalization, the repayment associated
with the capital inflow will cause the consumption stream under integration to be lower than
the consumption stream under autarky, making µ negative. However, because the amount
these countries had to borrow was low, the payments are small and eventually the consumption
stream under integration will become higher than under autarky. Conversely, for all other
quartiles, the initial level of capital is much lower than the steady state level. In the short run,
the consumption stream under liberalization, even after repayment, will be higher than that
under autarky, contributing to the positive µ. However, since the amount initially borrowed
was large, the cost of repayment catches up with the economy later, eventually causing the level
of consumption under liberalization to be lower than autarky, contributing to the negative µ.
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As can be noted by the negative values in Table 3.5, the way financing costs are repayed
greatly influences the welfare effect of financial liberalization. If the bulk of the repayment
occurs far enough into the future the short run welfare gain will be larger. Conversely, when
the repayment of debt is spread out evenly across states (Table 3.2) or front loaded (Table 3.5)
the gain in welfare will be lower. This brings to attention the importance of considering the
allocation of the costs from financial liberalization across time. When measuring welfare using
a short run horizon, these effects will be amplified.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the transitional dynamics of a policy change that leads to a temporary growth
effect. We find that that the methodological approach to measure the welfare impact of a policy
change like capital account liberalization can drive the magnitude of policy effect estimates.
Evaluating welfare gains from liberalizations under an infinite time horizon underestimates the
gains enjoyed in the decades following liberalization as differences in the consumption paths
of autarky and integration are large soon after liberalization. Yet these differences comprise
only a small fraction of welfare gains calculated using the infinite lifetime consumption stream.
Calculating welfare benefits over finite horizons may be more appropriate and policy-relevant for
evaluating policy changes such as capital account liberalization that lead to temporary growth
effects but permanent level effects on per capita incomes.
We do not claim that policies that lead to permanent effects on TFP and growth are
not important. We simply point out that policy changes that lead to temporary growth but
permanent level effects of this sort (like capital account liberalization) can add up to significant
increases in levels of per capita incomes. Examining the welfare consequences of a temporary
growth (and permanent level) effect is also the more consistent way of testing the predictions
of the neo-classical growth model in the context of capital account liberalization.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption Streams in Autarky and Integration: Ramsey Model
Figure 3.2: Consumption Streams in Autarky and Integration: GJ
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Calculating µ: The Percent Change in Lifetime Consumption
Figures 1.4 - 1.15. For an economy that supports a fixed exchange rate regime, I compare
welfare in two scenarios. In scenario A the government waits until a default episode to abandon
a fixed exchange rate regime, while in scenario B the government abandons the fixed exchange
rate regime before the default. The welfare impact, µ, is the consumption equivalent variation
between scenario A and scenario B. µ is calculated as the percent change in lifetime aggregate
consumption, C(cT , cN ), that is required to equate expected welfare in scenario A to that in
scenario B:
EA0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1 + µ)C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt) = E
B
0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt),
µ =
[
EB0
∑∞
t=0β
tU(C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt)
EA0
∑∞
t=0β
tU(C(CNt , C
T
t ), Gt)
] 1
ζ(1−σ)
.
At each state for wages and outstanding debt, {w,B}, the government faces a tree of possible
future realizations for each scenario. µ is the percent increase in lifetime aggregate consumption
that is required to make the government indifferent between the expected utility in the two
scenarios. I calculate µ for each point on the {w,B} state space. Given a starting point
{w,B} I make 1,000 simulations of streams with a length of 200 periods under each scenario.
µ is the change in lifetime consumption required to make the government indifferent to the
utility expected from either waiting until a default to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime or
immediately abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime.
Tables 1.4 and 1.6. Here µ is calculated assuming perfect foresight. I simulate the
model economy under scenario A 10,000 times. For each simulation under scenario A, I have
a corresponding simulation under scenario B. For simulations under scenario A where default
occurs, I calculate µ for the corresponding pair of simulations from scenarios A and B:
∞∑
t=0
A
βtU((1 + µ)C(cNt , c
T
t ), G(g
N
t , g
T
t )) =
∞∑
t=0
B
βtU(C(cNt , c
T
t ), G(g
N
t , g
T
t )),
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µ =
[∑∞
t=0
BβtU(C(cNt , c
T
t ), G(g
N
t , g
T
t ))∑∞
t=0
AβtU(C(cNt , c
T
t ), G(g
N
t , g
T
t ))
] 1
ζ(1−σ)
.
The discount factor βt makes utility in earlier periods affect welfare with a greater magni-
tude than utility in later periods. Since default episodes occur at different times in different
simulation streams, the welfare effect of a preemptive exchange rate regime switch will be af-
fected by the period the default occurs in. Take two identical default episodes; one occurs
in period 10, the other in period 1000. Though the effect of the regime switch on economic
fundamentals will be identical, the welfare effect of an exchange rate regime switch ahead of the
default will be larger for the earlier episode since β10 > β1000. To avoid the effect that the time
of default has on welfare, I calculate µ after aligning the default episodes to the same period in
the stream. Once default episodes are aligned, the welfare effect of the exchange rate regime
switch, µ, is comparable across streams.
A.2 Endogenizing the Exchange Rate Regime: A Discussion
In the model described in this paper, the decision to default is endogenous while the decision to
abandon the fixed exchange rate regime is exogenous. Imposing the exchange rate regime switch
exogenously is enough for the purpose of this paper: to capture the welfare effect of abandoning a
fixed exchange rate regime in an economy that could default on its foreign currency denominated
debt. This is because I test, in each state, whether or not abandoning the fixed exchange rate
regime would lead to welfare gains. It is true, however, that keeping the exchange rate regime
decision exogenous ignores interesting dynamics regarding currency speculation.
It is generally acknowledged that fixed exchange rate regimes tend to be unstable. Endog-
enizing the exchange rate regime decision means that the central bank’s decision to support a
fixed exchange rate regime is not regarded as fully credible by agents in the economy. Foreign
creditors and the government have the same information set and agents know when the govern-
ment will decide to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime and can calculate the probability
that they will abandon it.
I will describe the options that a government will have when it can decide both whether to
default and whether to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime. In order to simplify the problem
computationally, each period the government can either decide to default or to abandon the
fixed exchange rate regime. It can not do both in the same period.
Fixed Flexible
No Default 1 ↓→ 2 ↓
Default 3 → 4
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The choice set for the government given the state of the economy is as follows. When an
economy is not in default and is supporting a fixed exchange rate regime (cell 1), the government
can either default (move to cell 3) or abandon the fixed exchange rate regime (move to cell
2). When an economy is not in default and has a flexible exchange rate regime (cell 2), the
government can decide to default (move to cell 4). When an economy is in default and supports
a fixed exchange rate regime (cell 3) it can abandon the fixed exchange rate regime (move to
cell 4).
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Calculating the Welfare Effect of Austerity and Default
I measure welfare as the percent change in utility that would be required to equate welfare
between two scenarios. First, I measure the effect of austerity on welfare, µaust, by eliminating
the possibility of default. Welfare here, µaust, is the change in utility required to equate welfare
in the baseline economy to one with no default and is calculated as follows:
∞∑
t=0
nd
βt(1 + µaust)U(Ct, Gt, 1− lt) =
∞∑
t=0
b
βtU(Ct, Gt, 1− lt),
µaust =
( ∑∞
t=0
bβtU(Ct, Gt, 1− lt)∑∞
t=0
ndβtU(Ct, Gt, 1− lt)
)
− 1
where nd represents the economy where default is eliminated and b represents the baseline
economy. In order to calculate µaust I run a simulation of the economy under both scenarios
10,000 times, calculate µ for each pair, and report the average µ across these simulations.
Similarly, in order to calculate the welfare effect of default, I eliminate the ability to im-
plement austerity policies by fixing the tax rate. Here, the welfare effect, µdefa, is the percent
change in utility required to equate welfare from the baseline model to the model with no
austerity. The method for calculating µdefa is as above.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Quartiles by Capital to Output Ratio in 1995 for Non-OECD Countries
First Second Third Fourth
Uganda Bangladesh South Africa Panama
Madagascar Burkina Faso Dominican Republic Argentina
Mozambique Cameroon Nepal Iran
Ethiopia India Indonesia Ecuador
Sierra Leone Syria Uruguay Cyprus
Egypt Pakistan China Algeria
Rwanda Bolivia Honduras Zimbabwe
Benin Congo, D Morocco Guinea-Bissau
Ghana Comoros Barbados Zambia
Cote D’Ivoire Paraguay Botswana Brazil
Central Africa Sri Lanka Tunisia Mexico
Senegal Papua New Guinea Chile Hong Kong
Burundi Mauritius Fiji Peru
Guatemala Chad Congo, R Guyana
El Salvador Angola Cape Verde Jamaica
Nigeria Malawi Costa Rica Israel
Mauritania Gabon Nicaragua Thailand
Niger Colombia Philippines Korea
Togo Trinidad Malaysia Tanzania
Mali Guinea Venezuela Singapore
C.2 Quartiles by Capital to Output Ratio in 1995
First Second Third Fourth
Mexico Philippines Argentina Colombia
Malaysia Korea Peru Sril Lanka
Thailand South Africa Pakistan Zimbabwe
Indonesia Chile India Greece
Brazil Portugal Venezuela Turkey
Notes - µT reported in percentage points. Data on
P
E ratios are from the Emerging Markets Data Base.
The sample is also divided into quartiles based on the size of the premium R∗i −R∗.
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Figure C.1: Per period percentage change in utility
C.3 Another Way to Think of Welfare in the Short Run
The fact that the welfare effect of financial liberalization is accumulated mostly in the short run
can be illustrated in a different way. Here, I calculate the per period percent change in utility
between autarky and integration ∆t =
U intt −Uautt
Uautt
. Because the difference between consumption
in autarky and integration is greatest during the periods following liberalization, the value of
∆t is declining over time.
Figure C.1 plots ∆tβ
t for different values of time preference β. For the value of β used in
this paper, 0.96, 72% of the gain in welfare from liberalization is realized by year 5, and 94%
of the welfare gain is realized by year 10. The time preference of agents in the economy affect
the way they value the timing of consumption. Since liberalization serves to push consumption
to its steady state level in the short run, the value of time preference affects the way ∆t is
valued by the agent. As the discount factor decreases, the agent’s value of the percent change
in consumption decreases, implying that the value of liberalization decreases.
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